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1.  Introduction
The purpose of this monograph is to discuss and present analyses on how offering 
health insurance and rising health care costs impact the growth and survival of small 
businesses.1 While there have been numerous studies addressing the themes traditionally 
associated with employer health insurance offerings and small businesses2 (as discussed 
below), there has not been a longitudinal multivariate analysis addressing how offering 
health insurance may impact a small business’ growth and survival.
Health care expenditures have been increasing over time in the United States.
They were over 17.6 percent of the country’s gross domestic product in 2009.  In 2000 
they represented 13.2 percent.3 Nominal per capita national health expenditures 
increased 40 percent, from $4,789 in 2000 to $6490 in 20094.  Expenditures on health 
care and the rise in costs could hamper the growth and survival of small businesses.
Since almost all firms start out small (Haltiwanger et al. 2009), small firms are 
important to general economic growth, while their share of total employment is smaller 
than for larger firms.  Firms with less than 20 workers employ about 20 percent of all 
workers in the non-farm private economy versus about 48 percent employed by large 
firms (500+ workers) or almost 1 in 4 workers employed by very large firms (10,000+) –
based on data from the 1975-2005 Longitudinal Business Database (Haltiwanger et al. 
1 It is beyond the scope of this monograph to analyze how 2010 ACA will impact health insurance offering 
behavior of small businesses.
2 Such as determinants of a firm’s decision to offer health insurance, the factors that make small firms less 
likely to offer it and employer reaction to rising health care costs.
3 U.S. total expenditures on health as a percent of gross domestic product exceeds that of other countries in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  Switzerland has the next highest 
percent but trails behind the U.S. by 2.8 percent in 2000 and 3.7 percent in 2005 (OECD, 2007).  Without 
standard errors, we are unable to comment on the significance of these differences.
4 https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/.../highlights.pdf The authors’ deflated the data 
using BLS’ online CPI calculator.
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2009).  Although the statistics point out that most of this economic activity is 
concentrated in large employers, small businesses create (and destroy) a 
disproportionately large number of jobs (Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996)) and 
characterize new businesses, thus their growth and survival are important in the U.S. 
economy.
In order to grow and survive, small businesses must compete with larger 
businesses for employees.  In order to attract and retain workers, businesses of all sizes 
often offer health insurance to be competitive in the labor market.  However, small 
businesses may be at a disadvantage in hiring workers who value employer-sponsored 
health insurance (ESI) since premium costs are higher for smaller employers than for 
larger businesses.  This disadvantage in the labor market resulting from greater health 
care costs may have profound effects on the performance of new and small businesses 
and has important implications for overall economic growth.
Chapter 2 presents evidence showing higher premium costs and lower health 
insurance offer rates for small employers than for large employers.  In addition, small 
employers are more likely to employ low-wage workers (Brown and Medoff, 1989), 
which can place them at a further disadvantage for offsetting high premium costs with 
higher wages.5,6 Trends associated with fewer carriers in the small group insurance 
market can also have negative implications for small business access and affordability to 
insurance.  Finally, health insurance regulations may also affect offers of insurance to 
5 Empirical studies and various reports on small businesses use a multitude of definitions.  For example, 
small may be defined as less than 10, less than 25, less than 50 (GAO, 2009), less than 100, or less than 500 
employees (Small Business Administration).  When first citing findings from these various sources, the 
specific size definition used by the authors or organization generally is provided.
6 Brown and Medoff (1989) use various data sources with different size measures.
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employees, as well as the small business’s decision to grow and expand.  All of these 
factors can make it difficult for a small employer to offer a competitive compensation 
package to attract quality workers.
The state in which small business is located also affects their ability to offer 
health insurance because of a number of factors.  States can have varying health care 
costs, impose their own regulations on health insurance offerings, experience different 
small group health insurance markets in terms of the number of insurers and market 
shares, and are characterized by different percents of small and young businesses.  We 
will discuss these differences and how small business performance may be hampered as a 
result of state-level characteristics throughout this monograph.  The discussions provide 
descriptive statistics for economic characteristics at the state level, including differences 
in health insurance offers, premiums and the insurance regulatory environment.
Chapter 2 of this monograph highlights these state-level variations by focusing on 
4 states in the discussions, one from each region of the country.  Arizona in the west and 
New York in the northeast are discussed because on a number of economic dimensions 
relevant to small businesses and health insurance offers, statistics generally show more 
favorable conditions in these two states.  In contrast, North Dakota in the Midwest and 
Tennessee in the south tend to show less favorable conditions.7 For example, statistics on 
7 The authors admit that the selection of these states has been done in a very rudimentary fashion.  That is, 
states are picked based on how many times the state is an outlier on a number of different dimensions 
including differences in offer rates, premium increases, tax incentives for small businesses for offering 
health insurance, and characteristics of the states’ health insurance markets.  In addition, statistics on the 
state’s percent of employers that are young and small, as well as changes in the percent of the smallest 
establishments are taken into consideration.  Finally, since estimates are often based on MEPS-IC data and 
some states do not have data collected for them in 2000, these are excluded from consideration.  However, 
many other economic considerations are omitted (e.g., business tax rates).  The primary purpose of picking 
a few states is to aid in the discussion of how states can differ as numerous statistics are presented 
throughout the monograph.
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the percent of a state’s establishments belonging to the smallest firms8,9 show rather 
marked differences.  While the percent dropped from 2000 to 2005 by 0.2 percent in the 
country overall, North Dakota saw a 4.6 percentage point drop and New York saw a 0.6 
percent increase.  A number of factors in the business environment may contribute to 
these differences, such as changes in state tax codes creating more or less favorable 
conditions for a small business.  
In addition to geographic variation, differences by industry may also be relevant 
to our analysis of the growth and survival of small businesses and industry controls are 
included in the models.  Higher health care and insurance costs may make it difficult for 
small businesses to compete with larger employers for quality, skilled workers who may 
be integral to business performance in some industries.  Higher wages and salary are 
generally associated with higher skill levels and can consequently influence worker 
demand for health insurance.  That is, employees contributing to insurance premium costs 
on a pretax basis may value health insurance more because of their greater income and 
associated marginal tax rate.  If small businesses face higher costs for offering health 
insurance and find it difficult to offer this benefit, they may find it difficult to offer a 
compensation package that competes with those offered by larger employers for the 
higher skilled workers.  Ultimately, this disadvantage may hinder the growth and survival 
of small businesses and this monograph discusses relevant differences by industry.   
While the decision to offer health insurance may be influenced by a multitude of 
financial, labor, and insurance-related issues, how employers cope with rising health care 
8 Establishments refer to the physical location where business activity takes place.  A firm may control one 
or more establishments.
9 Throughout this monograph, references to the smallest firms will refer to firms with less than 10 
employees.  When discussing the largest firms, this will refer to those with 1,000 or more employees.  
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costs can place them at a further disadvantage in attracting and retaining skilled workers.  
In chapter 3 we present findings showing small employers may eliminate insurance offers 
and/or reduce the generosity of offerings.  Aside from making changes to benefits, 
businesses may make changes in their employment practices, such as increasing their 
reliance on part-time workers or hiring workers with lower expected health care costs.  
While these strategies may help the small employer control escalating compensation 
costs associated with offering health insurance, their ultimate effect on the quality, 
morale, and productivity of the workforce and business performance are unknown.    
The focus of this monograph is on the effects of offering health insurance on the 
growth and survival of small businesses, however, other economic factors may be 
simultaneously influencing organizations and are discussed in chapter 4.  These include 
the general condition of the business environment, as well as trends in industries and 
workforces.  For example, we study the growth and survival of small businesses from 
2000 to 2005, which includes the recession of 2001.  Evidence suggests that business 
growth during economic downturns is less likely than during good times.  In addition, the 
private sector of the U.S. economy has seen a transition away from manufacturing and 
unionization in recent decades, which may contribute to fewer insurance offerings by 
employers of all sizes.  Finally, the economy has also been characterized in recent 
decades by an aging workforce, which can also contribute to a sicker risk pool and higher 
health insurance costs for an employer.  This may be especially true for small employers 
who have been found to have an older workforce (Headd, 2000; Nichols et al., 1997),10
10 Headd (2000) defines a small business as firms with less than 500 employees, and some might argue that 
this many employees does not truly reflect a small business.  However, this is the definition used by the 
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making it more challenging financially to offer competitive compensation packages.  The 
evidence presented in this chapter show that difficult economic times and trends in 
industries and workforces might place small businesses at an even greater disadvantage 
when competing with large businesses for skilled labor.  
The evidence presented in these early chapters suggest that many different 
workforce, employer, and market factors may influence the growth and survival of small 
businesses and are important to consider in our empirical analysis.  In Chapter 5 we
describe the data sources used in our analysis, and in Chapter 6 we begin the discussion 
of our methodology for examining the effects of offering health insurance on the growth 
and survival of small businesses.  No known studies address these issues and public 
access to relevant data measures can limit applied microanalysis of them.  
In our study we link two confidential datasets, the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) and the Longitudinal Business Database
(LBD).  The former provides data on whether an employer offers health insurance, which 
we use as a proxy for health care costs.  Measures on workforce and employer 
characteristics are also available.  The LBD provides information on employer payroll 
and size over time and permits analysis of longitudinal changes in small business 
performance and survival using these measures.  Linkage of these data provides a rich 
and unique source of information to study these issues so important in the U.S. economy.  
While many studies have documented the low rate of health insurance offers among 
small firms and have examined the potential factors determining this low rate, no 
Small Business Administration.  Nichols et al. (1997) use different data sources that define small 
businesses using different size categories including less than 100 employees. 
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multivariate studies have examined the relationship between the growth and survival of 
small businesses and health care costs.  
The mixed findings of our instrument tests indicate that caution should be 
exercised when interpreting our results.  With that caveat, we find that businesses 
offering health insurance offer larger total compensation packages than do similar 
businesses that do not offer coverage to their workers.  These businesses also grow faster 
and survive longer.  We also present results controlling for age as well as size.  In these 
regressions, young businesses (both large and small) that offer health insurance grow at 
the same rate as those that do not, possibly due to selection effects.  However, offering 
health insurance was correlated with higher employment and payroll growth at both large 
and small businesses.  Finally, survival was strongly, positively correlated with Health 
Insurance Offering for older establishments at both large and small firms and for small 
young firms. In sum, these results suggest that young small businesses offering health 
insurance seem to be  more likely to survive, and once they have been in business for a 
while, offering health insurance seems to increase their chances of success (as measured 
by employment and payroll growth).
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2.  Health Insurance Offers
This chapter provides a brief summary of the reasons and factors influencing why 
a small business may or may not offer health insurance. 11 We categorize these into 
financial and labor market factors, insurance products and markets, and the health 
insurance regulatory environment.  High premiums and costs factor prominently in 
reasons why employers do not offer insurance, while employee recruitment and retention 
dominate the discussion of why some employers offer the benefit.  
Premiums, risk-related costs, administrative expenses, and lack of familiarity with 
tax advantages represent financial reasons why small businesses may be reluctant to offer 
Employee Sponsored Insurance (ESI).  Labor-related factors are important to our analysis 
of the growth or employment of small businesses and the decision to offer ESI.  
Therefore, the influences of employee demand, as well as recruitment and retention, are 
presented.  We discuss various aspects of insurance products and markets, including 
access and the introduction of lower premium cost options, which may affect small 
businesses more than larger employers.  Finally, we review various regulations and
mandates passed in recent decades that may potentially influence the small businesses’ 
decision to offer ESI as well as their decision to grow.    
In our empirical analyses, we use the employer’s offer of health insurance to 
workers as a proxy for health care costs.  While this is not a perfect match, we believe it 
11 Issues related to small businesses offering health insurance are examined in the following but not 
exhaustive list of references: Abraham et al., 2009; Neese 2009; Pierron and Fronstin 2008; Blumberg 
2007; Gates et al. 2007; Kapur et al. 2006; Matthews et al. 2006; Kaiser Family Foundation/Health 
Research Educational Trust 2005, 2000; Bunce and Wieske 2005; Actuarial Research Corporation 2003; 
Carpenter 2003; Fronstin et al., 2003; Glied et al., 2003; Monheit and Schone 2003; Buchmueller and 
DiNardo 2002; Lee 2002; Garrett et al. 2001; Congressional Budget Office 2000; General Accounting 
Office 2000; Fronstin and Helman, 2000; Monheit and Vistnes, 1999; Nichols et al., 1997; Morrisey et al. 
1994).  
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is a reasonable measure of changes in employers’ ability to pay.  Between 2000 and 
2005, the percentage of small firms offering health insurance declined.  There was a more 
substantial decline in the share of small-firm employees who worked in establishments 
that offered health insurance.  Over the same period health insurance offers by large firms 
was largely unchanged.  Table 2.1 supports these points, while Table 2.2 gives evidence 
that the pattern largely held across industries.  While the percent of establishments 
offering insurance and belonging to the smallest firm size significantly decreased from 
39.6 percent in 2000 to 35.7 percent in 2005,12 the percent of employees in 
establishments that offer health insurance in the smallest firms significantly dropped from 
53.2 percent to 43.7 percent during this same time period.13
Virtually all businesses start out small, which leads us to look at offers by young 
firms also.  Table 2.2 shows the percent of establishments offering health insurance by 
firm size and firm age.  In the smallest establishments of any firm age a significant 
decrease in the percent of establishments offering health insurance is seen.  Small 
establishments belonging to firms with 10 to 24 employees and less than 5 years old saw 
12 MEPS-IC estimates of offers by establishments from firms with less than 50 employees show a similar 
declining pattern from 2000 to 2004 from 47.2 percent to 41.9 percent, but then increase in 2005 to 43.4 
percent.  The overall decrease from 2000 to 2005 is significant.
13 All estimates based on the MEPS-IC presented in this monograph use data from private sector 
establishments.  While collected in the MEPS-IC, public sector data for state and local governments are not 
included in the figures, discussion, or analyses.  Also, the text will often discuss publicly-available statistics 
from the MEPS-IC for establishments from the smallest firms (less than 10 employees) and the largest
firms (1,000 or more employees).  Readers will often also find similar statistics presented for small 
employers defined as having less than 50 employees in footnotes.  This alternative definition coincides with 
our empirical analyses on small businesses, defined as those with less than 50 workers.  Our study uses this 
definition in order to avoid potential disclosure on the smaller sample of businesses with less than 10 
workers.     
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a significant drop in the percent offering health insurance from 57 percent in 2000 to 38.2 
percent in 2005.14
The economic, regulatory, and demographic characteristics of the state in which a 
small business is located may also impact its decision to offer health insurance.  Most 
relevant may be the state’s per capita health care costs, insurance markets, and health 
insurance legislation passed by the state making the offer of this employee benefit more
or less attractive.  Our empirical analysis will include state fixed effects to help capture 
the various influences of the businesses’ environment.  Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show state-
level maps using the MEPS-IC to show the difference in the percent of establishments 
between the smallest and largest firms offering health insurance in 2000 and 2005, 
respectively (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 2000 and 2005).  
These maps show that New York is among the states with the smallest percentage point 
difference in offers, averaging about 54 percent for 2000 and 2005.  This is small relative 
to some states, such as North Dakota and Tennessee, both with a difference in offers 
greater than 70 percentage points.  As noted earlier, New York was selected for 
discussion purposes because on a number of factors related to small businesses and health 
insurance New York was generally more favorable than North Dakota and Tennessee.  
These factors may reduce the likelihood that small businesses in these two states offer 
health insurance.  
14 When defining small and large establishments using firm size of less than 50 and 50 or more employees, 
the establishments belonging to the youngest firms (less than 5 years of age) saw significant decreases in
offers whether small or large.  Small establishments belonging to firms of all other firm ages also saw 
significant decreases.  The same pattern is seen when looking at the percent of employees in establishments 
that offer health insurance and from small or large firms. 
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Many factors impact the decision of whether or not a business offers ESI.  
Therefore, while addressing why a business offers insurance or not is beyond the scope of 
this paper,15 awareness of these factors is important.  These are discussed throughout the 
remainder of this chapter and Table 2.3 provides a summary of select empirical studies 
and reports examining these issues related to health insurance offers.  
2.1  Financial factors
2.1.1  Price sensitivity and premium variability.  The number one reason 
generally given by small employers for not offering ESI is cost, premiums are too high.  
In addition, with fewer employees (i.e., potential enrollees), small employers generally do 
not have as much clout as larger employers to negotiate lower rates.  Figure 2.3 shows the 
change from 2000 to 2005 in the average total single premium (in dollars) per enrolled 
employee at private-sector establishments that offer health insurance by firm size using 
the MEPS-IC (AHRQ 2000 and 2005). The increase in premiums during this time period 
for any firm size is 45 to 54 percent.16 Premium costs in both years are highest in 
establishments belonging to the smallest firms.17 The largest gap in premium costs is 
15 While our empirical analysis will predict health insurance offers to address their endogeneity in models 
explaining changes in business performance, our work does not attempt to explain offers per se. 
16 While increases in premiums from 2000 to 2005 for establishments from the smallest firms are not 
significantly larger than increases in premiums for those from the largest firms, plans offered by small 
firms may become increasingly less generous than those offered by the largest firms.  For example, larger 
increases in deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance may have occurred during this time period for the 
plans offered by the establishments from the smallest firms.
17 In a report prepared for the Small Business Administration (Actuarial Research Corporation, 2003), no 
difference is seen in premiums by firm size when using 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation data that 
includes estimates for firms with 1 to 9 employees.  In contrast, 1997 MEPS-IC data does show higher 
premiums for the smallest businesses.  The Small Business Administration report suggests that since 
administrative costs are higher for the small employers, similar premiums may reflect lower actuarial 
values for their plans.  Small firms may purchase less generous plans (e.g., with higher deductibles or fewer 
11
between establishments from firms with less than 10 employees and 10 to 24 employees, 
growing from a difference of $223 in 2000 to $327 in 2005.
As health care costs and premiums rise, employers’ financial burden can also 
increase through their contributions towards premiums.  Inflation-adjusted premiums 
from the MEPS-IC for single coverage for 2000 rose over 13 percent from $2,655 to 
$3,010 in 2005. 18 Employer outlays for ESI also increased.  From 2000 to 2005, the cost 
of employer contributions for single coverage and family coverage rose approximately 50 
and 30 percent respectively according to national totals from the MEPS-IC (see Table 
2.4).  
Similar to these national trends, almost all states saw a significant increase from 
2000 to 2005 in the average total single premium per enrolled employee at establishments 
that offer health insurance regardless of size.  While the smallest establishments across 
the U.S. saw premium costs for single coverage rise about 45 percent from 2000 to 2005 
(AHRQ 2000 and 2005), some states saw larger increases (see Figure 2.4). For example, 
premiums for single coverage for the smallest employers rose over 96 percent in North 
Dakota.  As noted earlier, North Dakota fared worse than many states on a number of 
factors related to small business and health insurance offerings.  The larger increase in 
premium costs in this state may be related to these other factors such as the number of 
insurance carriers and the market share for the largest carrier (see discussion below).19
covered services).  In addition, state regulations may prevent insurers from raising premiums significantly 
in order to cover actual costs that include medical and administrative expenses. State regulations may also 
limit the extent of premium variation.  Finally, comparing premium costs between offering firms, large and 
small, does not provide information on the costs faced by non-offering firms.  These costs can be higher.  
18 Other surveys also show large increases in premium costs (Holve et al. 2002; Gencarelli, 2005).
19 Note also that North Dakota has a lower median age than the nation as a whole – although it does have 
2% more people 65 years of age or older 
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Based on MEPS-IC estimates, the U.S. increase in premiums for family coverage 
rose for the establishments from the smallest firms by about 53 percent, and Figure 2.5 
shows that states with increases close to this average are exclusively located in the 
western half of the country while the largest premium increases are concentrated in the 
eastern half.  Tennessee and Arizona increases in family coverage premiums deviate from 
the average with increases of more than 86 percent and about 32 percent, respectively.20
Workforce characteristics may help explain some of this variation.  For example, greater 
proportions of older workers with poorer health status and greater health care costs in 
some states may lead to higher premium costs. 
The decision to offer insurance means the small employer is committing to a large 
financial and administrative burden.  Health insurance costs can make up a substantial 
percentage of the employer’s cost for worker compensation packages, and this percentage 
can grow with rising health care costs.  Average health insurance costs as a share of 
payroll increased from 8 to 11 percent for small firms21 from 2000 to 2005, representing 
a 30 percent increase (Eibner 2008).22,23 Small businesses have been found to be more 
sensitive to price than large businesses when deciding whether or not to offer insurance 
(Hadley and Reschovsky, 2002; Gruber and Lettau, 2004; Feldman et al., 1997) and have 
(http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo_id=&_geoContext=&_street=&_
county=&_cityTown=&_state=04000US38&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010)
20 The U.S. increase from 2000 to 2005 for establishments belonging to small firms defined as less than 50 
employees is almost 46 percent, but the U.S. increase for establishments belonging to large firms (50 or 
more employees) is about 52 percent.  
21 Firms with less than 25 employees (Eibner, 2008).
22 Economic burden is measured using ratio of per-capita health insurance costs relative to per capita 
payroll.  The analysis finds that payroll remained relatively stable during this time, therefore, the increased 
burden measured by this ratio is attributed to increases in health care costs.
23 Eibner notes, however, that a lot of variance existed.  That is, 25 percent of businesses with less than 25 
employees spent less than 6 percent while another 25 percent spent more than 15 percent of payroll on 
health insurance benefits.
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a higher elasticity of demand (Gruber and Lettau, 2004).24 Hadley and Reschovsky 
(2002) also find that very small employers and those employing more low-wage workers 
are more responsive to premium costs.
Economic theory posits that employees not employers bear the cost of rising 
health insurance costs through reduced wages (Summers 1989; Pauly 1994).25,26,27 That 
is, workers who value the insurance offering accept a wage lower than they would have 
received if no health insurance had been offered.  But since small firm workers tend to 
earn lower wages,28 these workers are less able to offset the cost of health insurance 
through reduced wages.  This may contribute to small employers being less likely to offer 
health insurance.  Using the MEPS-IC, Table 2.5 shows that the percent of establishments 
from the smallest firms with more low wage workers offering insurance is much smaller 
than for establishments with fewer low-wage workers.  
24 Hadley and Reschovsky (2002) and Gruber and Lettau (2004) define small as less than 100 employees 
and Feldman et al. (1997) define small as less than 50 employees.
25 The goal of our analysis is to examine the impact of health care costs on a small employer’s growth and 
survival, and not to address compensating differentials involving wages and health insurance offers.  For 
discussions on compensating differentials see Hwang et al. (1992), Currie and Madrian (1999), and Royalty 
(2008).  
26 However, empirical studies have not consistently shown this result (Currie and Madrian 1999) and 
Sommers (2005) indicates that when wages are sticky and insurance premiums increase, the employer will 
bear some of the burden.
27 In the cross section, we expect to see more productive workers earning higher wages and being offered 
health insurance.  While attempts are made in the models to control for worker quality and skill, the authors  
acknowledge it is difficult to distinguish between increases in small business performance resulting from 
unmeasured aspects of labor quality and direct ways in which health insurance may increase performance.  
Nguyen and Zawacki (2009) study the relationship between health insurance offers and labor productivity 
in the manufacturing sector.  The authors point out that if health insurance improves worker health and that 
improved health increases productivity, then ceteris paribus, a positive relationship between health 
insurance offers and productivity would be seen.  Similarly in our study, if health insurance improves 
worker health this may translate into improved performance by the small business. These findings 
generally hold using different definitions of small. 
28 Small businesses pay lower wages than larger firms and this may be due to the higher costs of turnover or 
monitoring in larger firms (Belfield and Wei 2004).  Brown and Medoff (1989) study the employer size-
wage effect, which is found to be both an establishment and firm size effect, and find that higher-quality 
workers in large firms explains about one half of the wage differential.  The authors find that offering 
inferior working conditions, using high wages to forestall unionization, and greater product market power 
do little to explain the remaining difference in wages paid by large versus small employers.   
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Undoubtedly, part of the challenge for small businesses is the unpredictable rate 
at which health care costs faced by small businesses rise (Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, 2008).29 Small employers, with more low-wage workers (Brown and 
Medoff, 1989; Oi and Idson 1999) and greater turnover (Nichols, et al. 1997) than larger 
employers may be particularly vulnerable to rising costs.  Variability in premium costs 
has been shown to be negatively associated with the percentage of high-wage workers 
and positively related to the firm’s turnover rate (Cutler, 1994; Nichols et al., 1997).30
The variability in total health insurance costs faced by industries from year-to-
year from 2000 to 2005 is shown in Table 2.6 (AHRQ 2000-2005).  Establishments in the 
agriculture, fishing, and forestry industry, a sector with a smaller number of 
establishments relative to other sectors but with almost 84 percent of business with less 
than 10 workers in 2005 (AHRQ 2005), saw the percent change in total costs vary from 
decreases of about 26 percent to increases of over 74 percent during different year-to-
year periods.  In contrast, professional services, the second largest sector with almost 1.4 
million establishments in 2005 and over 60 percent of establishments with less than 10 
workers, saw only increases in total costs that range from 4 percent from 2004 to 2005 to 
almost 22 percent from 2002 to 2003.  
29 In this report, small businesses ranged from 3 to 50 employees.
30 The impact of expansions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 to 
businesses with less than 20 employees in some states on turnover is uncertain.  COBRA amended the 
federal law Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, which applied to firms with 20 or 
more employees.  COBRA required temporary continuation of group health insurance to employees and 
their dependents when employment was terminated.  As of 2009, 40 states subsequently established 
programs to extend COBRA coverage to firms with less than 20 workers (Kaiser State Health Facts 2009) 
(see Table 2.7).  Employees of these very small businesses may feel less locked into their positions if they 
can leave the employer and continue insurance coverage.  On the other hand, small businesses may be able 
to recruit more easily if individuals know that COBRA provisions have been set up.  While some states 
only provide continuation of coverage for 4 months, more than 24 percent of the 40 states continue 
coverage for 3 years.  Individuals must pay the full premium cost for COBRA coverage, and in some states 
an additional administrative cost.  In most states, the individual pays 100-102 percent of the group premium 
cost, but the cost is 115 percent in Florida and 125 percent in Nevada (Kaiser State Health Facts 2009).  
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2.1.2.  Regulations on premiums.  As discussed above, cost is a primary reason 
small businesses give for not offering health insurance to employees.  Variation in 
premiums charged to small employers providing the same coverage can be quite large, 
prompting 47 states by 2003 to adopt regulations on premium variability (General 
Accounting Office (GAO), 2003).  However, differences in premium-setting 
requirements and specific restrictions could still vary across state borders.  For example, 
premiums charged to small businesses could be substantially affected by different risk 
factors.  In addition, these regulations often stipulated how much premiums could be 
adjusted upon renewal but not how the total amount of premiums in the small group 
market could increase or how often premiums could be increased (GAO 2003).
Some state requirements include limitations on premium variation among small 
businesses but these apply only to insurers.  In other words, these only affect employers 
purchasing coverage from insurers (GAO 2003).  These regulations may have little 
impact, since small businesses in a National Federation of Independent Business poll31
report being more likely to purchase insurance from brokers or agents than insurers.  
Only 11 percent of small employers report buying insurance directly from insurers, while 
31 According to Dennis (2000), membership in the National Federation of Independent Business is made up 
of over one-half million owners of independent businesses throughout the country and found in all 
industries, about 1 in 10 employers in the U.S. is a member.  98 percent of members have firms with less 
than 100 workers.  In contrast to the known profile of the small firm population, the National Federation of 
Independent Business sample is older, disproportionately located in small cities and towns, and larger on 
average (members’ median size is 6 employees and almost 60 percent of the small business population 
have 4 or fewer employees).  In general, results cited in this monograph from polls of National Federation 
of Independent Business members have 80 to 90 percent response rates.
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71 percent of small employers offering health insurance report in 2007 purchasing 
coverage through a broker or agent (Dennis 2007).32
2.1.3.  Risk-related costs and participation rates. Small business’ reluctance to 
offer health insurance can arise from different sources of risk and associated financial 
factors.  First, the employer may feel that firm revenues and profits are too variable to 
take on the financial commitment to offer ESI.  New businesses, usually starting out 
small, may be particularly uncertain about their financial future and reluctant to offer 
ESI.  This apprehension may have increased from 2000 to 2005, particularly with the 
recession during 2001.  MEPS-IC estimates reveal that establishments belonging to the 
youngest firms (less than 5 years old) experienced the greatest drop in the percent 
offering insurance (data not shown).  The percent of establishments offering insurance 
dropped from 36.8 percent in 2000 to 27.7 percent in 2005 (AHRQ 2000 and 2005).  The 
decrease in offers is also significant in all other firm age categories, but the drop is 
smaller.33
Adverse health risks are also related to the small businesses’ concern regarding 
the uncertainty of premiums.  One very sick employee can raise premium costs for a 
small employer in one year’s time.34 If only a small percentage of employees enroll in a 
health plan offered by a small business, insurers are more concerned that only sick 
32 8 percent purchased insurance through a business organization or trade group, and 5 percent from an 
association of providers (Dennis, 2007).  
33 The same patterns are found when looking at the percent of employees in establishments that offer health 
insurance by firm age.
34 Monheit and Vistnes (1994) find, however, little evidence that workers at small firms (25 or fewer 
workers) and their dependents would be adverse health risks if they obtained coverage comparable to that 
held by large-firm employees.  In addition, the insured at small (less than 50 employees) and large 
employers have reported similar health characteristics (GAO, 2001).  
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employees are enrolling.  Therefore, minimum participation rates are sometimes imposed 
to avoid the risk of adverse selection.  A 2003 National Federation of Independent 
Business poll indicates that one-third of all small businesses faced minimum participation 
requirements, although businesses with less than 10 employees were less likely to face 
this requirement (Morrisey, 2003).  To raise participation rates and avoid adverse 
selection, insurers may require the employer to pay 50 to 100 percent of the premium cost 
for employees (Gencarelli, 2005).  This increases the financial burden for offering ESI 
and can reduce offer rates.
Insurers’ concerns regarding the risk pool at a small employer leads to insurers 
using medical underwriting35 and raising premiums to cover the cost of this additional 
process for small employers.  Medical underwriting leads to small employers with 
healthy workers being charged low premiums and small employers with less healthy 
workers being charged higher premiums.  42 percent of establishments with 1 to 4 
employees offering insurance were subject to medical underwriting, while only 21 
percent of firms with 50 or more workers underwent this process (Cantor et al., 1995).  
As noted earlier, greater premium variability is found among small firms than 
large firms (Cutler 1994) and considered evidence that greater adverse selection issues 
exist in the small group market (Gruber 2000).  For very small groups, each person may 
be required to provide a detailed medical history.  This adds a cost that is not incurred by 
insurers for large employers whose employees are not screened as extensively (GAO, 
2001).  Since employee health conditions are scrutinized with medical underwriting and 
changes in just one or more employees can result in premium changes, small firms will 
35 Medical underwriting refers to insurers calculating expected medical costs based on the health status of 
enrollees in order to set a firm’s premiums (Lee, 2002).
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experience more premium variability, which can discourage them from offering 
insurance.  Finally, to help protect themselves from an unanticipated large expense, 
insurers may also add a surcharge of 1 to 5 percent of the small employer’s premiums to 
increase their financial reserves (GAO, 2001).   
2.1.4.  Administrative costs. While workers’ health status and rising health care 
costs can lead to higher premiums, administrative costs can also contribute towards the 
cost of premiums and have been shown to be a significant factor in small business’ 
decision to offer ESI (Abraham et al. 2009).36 The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO, 2001) found that these costs represent 20 to 25 percent of the premium cost for 
small businesses but only 10 percent for large firms.  This is because fixed administrative 
costs such as marketing, billing, and pricing for ESI are lower when spread over a larger 
number of employees.  The loading factor on insurance37 purchased by firms with less 
than 5 employees has been found to be over 40 percent higher than that on very large 
firms with over 10,000 employees (Congressional Research Service, 1988).  As noted by 
Nichols et al (1997), small businesses tend to have greater turnover.  The authors 
comment that an employer’s changing workforce leads to repeatedly enrolling and 
disenrolling and medically underwriting subscribers and insurers may charge high 
administrative costs to cover the associated expenses. 
The majority of small employers purchase insurance through a broker and agent.  
Large employers, on the other hand, often employ their own human resource specialists 
36 The authors use categorical measures of establishment size, including 3 to 10 or less than employees.
37 The loading factor is the administrative expense added to the premium cost to cover activities such as 
billing and enrollment.
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who perform various administrative tasks (e.g., determining eligibility, enrollment, 
educating employees, etc.).   Brokers and agents can contribute to higher premiums for 
small businesses, ranging from 8 to 10 percent of the premium cost (Actuarial Research 
Corporation, 2003; GAO 2001).38 This cost is generally greater than the lump sum or 
fixed hourly fee paid by larger employers for assistance with administering health 
insurance benefits (GAO 2001).  In addition, because of their size, small firms have 
difficulty containing the cost of ESI because they lack bargaining clout and cannot afford 
to hire specialists to negotiate with insurance companies (Carpenter 2003).
Administrative costs associated with self-insured indemnification may also 
prevent small businesses from pursuing this option.  Large firms are more likely to self-
insure because they can afford to hire staff to administer the plans, they also have the 
financial resources to pay medical claims, and the large employers can negotiate with 
health care providers in order to set up customized arrangements for deductibles and 
copayments (Pierron and Fronstin 2008).  MEPS-IC estimates show these patterns.  
About 79 percent of establishments from firms with 500 or more employees self-insured 
at least one plan in 2005.  In contrast, only about 12 percent of establishments from small 
firms (whether defined as less than 50 or less than 100) self-insured at least one health 
plan in the same year.39 No significant increase is seen from 2000.40
38 Broker commissions can cost small businesses (2 to 50 workers) 2 to 8 percent more in premium costs, 
and are even included by insurers in the premiums for small businesses not using brokers (Conwell, 2002).
39 The 2006 Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust report and Pierron and 
Fronstin (2008) show similar patterns.
40 The same patterns are seen when comparing establishments from small firms defined as less than 50 
employees and large firms with 50 or more employees.
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Self-insuring is often appealing to employers who are then only subject to federal 
regulations, which supersede state ESI regulations and mandates.41 Firms who self-
insure can also save on premium costs in a number of ways.  They avoid paying state 
premium taxes, profit/risk charges, and broker commissions.  These expenses can 
contribute from 2 to 11 percent to premium costs (Actuarial Research Corporation, 2003).  
To help reduce administrative costs, small employers may purchase insurance 
coverage through associations or trusts.  It has been stated, however, that these plans 
would do little to lower administrative costs (Congressional Budget Office 2000).  In 
fact, administrative and insurer costs may actually rise if the association or trust must 
market itself to small businesses (Actuarial Research Corporation, 2003).  This report 
goes on to say that economies of scale cannot be achieved for some administrative costs 
such as underwriting applications, renewals, booklets with plan costs, and premium 
collections for specific enrollments each month.  In 2001, 21 states had health purchasing 
alliances to help small businesses purchase insurance.   While these alliances have helped 
increase options they have not been found to reduce costs (Wicks, Hall, and Meyer 
2000), increase the percent of small businesses’ offering insurance (Long and Marquis 
2001b) or grow or maintain enrollment.  With group purchasing cooperatives accounting 
for a very small percentage of each state’s enrollment in ESI (less than 5 percent), 
reduced administrative costs and premiums are considered difficult to achieve (GAO 
2000).  
41 When employers purchase insurance coverage from insurance companies, they are subject to state and 
federal laws.  However, ERISA exempts self-insured plans from state mandates and this motivates many 
employers to self-insure.  ERISA prevents multi-state employers from meeting regulations from all the 
different states where they operate.
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2.1.5.  Tax advantages.  Compounding the concerns about cost is the small 
employers’ possible lack of knowledge about the tax treatment for health insurance 
premium costs. The 2002 Small Employer Health Benefits Survey revealed that 57 
percent of small employers did not know that health insurance premiums are 100 percent 
tax deductible for employers (Fronstin et al., 2003).  38 percent responded that they did 
not know that employees do not pay tax on the share of premiums paid by the employer.  
If employers do not realize that offering health insurance may provide some tax 
advantages, they lack this incentive to offer benefits.  On the other hand, if the small 
employer has a predominantly low wage workforce, these workers would benefit less 
from the tax treatment.
Some states have also set up other tax incentive programs for small employers, 
which businesses may be unaware of.   These programs may provide transitional tax 
credits when small businesses insure for the first time or premium subsidies that go 
directly to the employee or through the employer (Kauffman-RAND Institute for 
Entrepreneurship Public Policy (KRI), 2007).  Table 2.7 shows that in 2008, 13 states or 
about 25 percent of all states offered tax incentives for small employers to purchase 
health insurance (Kaiser State Health Facts 2008).  7 of these states authorized tax 
credits, while 6 states offered deductions to small employers offering health insurance.  
Arizona provides a tax credit as incentive to small employers to offer insurance, but 
North Dakota, New York, and Tennessee do not provide tax credits or deductions.
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2.2  Labor market
2.2.1.  Employee characteristics and demand for own employer’s health
insurance. Employee demand can be important in the employer’s decision to offer ESI.  
If a business believes its workers may not need or want health insurance from their own 
employer, the benefit may not be offered.42 This is supported by evidence showing
workers at firms not offering ESI have characteristics similar to workers at firms offering 
ESI who decline insurance coverage (Long and Marquis, 1993).  These workers tend to 
be young, low-wage earners who work part-time.      
Further research supports these findings.  Small employers who do not offer 
insurance have workers with a low demand for health insurance, including relatively 
young and healthy workers and those likely to have high turnover (Monheit and Vistnes, 
1994, 1999).43,44,45 In contrast, firms with workers who earn higher wages, have a higher 
level of educational attainment and lower rates of turnover, and with higher gross revenue 
are significantly more likely to offer health insurance (Holve et al. 2003).46 However, 
using somewhat different measures of worker demand to capture the effects of human 
capital and income-related factors, including tenure, age, household income, and 
education, Abraham et al. (2009) conclude that very little of the difference in offer rates 
between smaller and larger establishments can be attributed to worker demand.  Part of 
42 Monheit and Vistnes (2008) find that individuals expressing low preferences for health insurance are less 
likely to enroll in offered plans.
43 Levy (1998) does not look exclusively at small firms but finds that firms with all middle-age workers or 
with all older workers are more likely to offer insurance than firms with all young workers.
44 Small businesses have also been found to be more likely to hire workers receiving public assistance
(Headd 2000).  If the government program provides coverage for medical expenses, this can also reduce the 
demand for ESI.    
45 Monheit and Vistnes (1994) define small firms as having less than 26 employees.
46 Holve et al. (2003) look at businesses with 3 to 24 workers.
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the explanation for the difference in these findings on the relationship between offers of 
ESI and worker demand may relate to Abraham et al. (2009) using MEPS household data 
rather than business data.  For example, the authors use individual tenure rather than 
turnover at the employer level and use household income rather than a measure of wages 
for the business’ workforce.  
As mentioned earlier, economic theory states that employees carry the financial 
burden for health insurance costs with reduced wages.47 Employees who are low wage 
and changing jobs often, however, may be less inclined to trade wages for health 
insurance coverage than high-wage workers (Nichols et al. 1997).48 Table 2.5 shows that 
the percent of establishments belonging to firms of all sizes and offering insurance is 
smaller in low-wage establishments49 than high-wage establishments (AHRQ 2000 and 
2005).50,51 Earlier data from 1987 and 1996 shows similar patterns and when offer rates 
were generally higher in these years, high-wage small firms had similar offer rates to 
large firms (Lee 2002).52 However, other studies show large firms are more likely than 
47 However, empirical studies have not consistently shown this result (Currie and Madrian 1999) and 
Sommers (2005) indicates that when wages are sticky and insurance premiums increase, the employer will 
bear some of the burden.
48 While not focusing on employer size, some studies examining the uninsured find that lack of 
affordability for health insurance leads to noncoverage (Bundorf and Pauly 2006; Levy and DeLeire 2008).  
Low-wage workers may find the higher premiums in small businesses particularly unaffordable.  
49 Low-wage establishments have 50 percent or more of their workers earning a low wage and high-wage 
establishments have less than 50 percent of their workers earning low wages.  In 2000, the MEPS-IC 
defined low wage as less than $9.50 per hour and in 2005 defined low wage as less than $10 per hour.
50 Marquis and Long (2001b) find that employers of low-wage workers are much less likely to offer health 
insurance than other employers, although the authors do not look exclusively at small employers. 
51 Household data also shows that low-wage workers are less likely to be offered or eligible for ESI than 
high-wage workers (Garrett et al. 2001; Collins et al. 2003).
52 Firms with less than 26 workers are used for these findings (Lee, 2002). 
24
small firms to offer health insurance even after controlling for wage levels or average 
payroll per employee (Glied et al. 2003; Garrett et al. 2001).53
Younger and older workers may have lower demand for health insurance.  Young 
workers may not value health insurance as much as older workers and may be voluntarily 
uninsured because they have a better health status.  Individuals over age 65 are eligible 
for Medicare and this can reduce the need for ESI by these older workers.  Consequently, 
small businesses may have less employee demand for ESI, since small employers tend to 
have either younger or older workers (Headd, 2000; Nichols et al., 1997), whereas large 
firms employ more workers in prime age (i.e., 25-54).   
In contrast to small firms, large firms are much more likely to offer ESI to part-
time and temporary workers (although few temporary workers are offered ESI) 
(Econometrica, 2007; 2004 Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research Educational 
Trust).  Table 2.5 shows the change from 2000 to 2005 in the percent of private-sector 
establishments that offer health insurance by firm size and percent of full-time employees 
using the MEPS-IC.  These data show that establishments with fewer full-time workers 
are less likely to offer health insurance, regardless of firm size.  About 21 percent of 
establishments with less than 25 percent of their workers employed full-time are offered 
health insurance.54 Data from the MEPS-IC also shows that only about 9.5 percent of 
establishments belonging to the smallest firms with predominantly part-time workers 
offer health insurance versus over 90 percent of establishments from the largest firms 
(See Table 2.5).   It is interesting that from 2000 to 2005, these establishments have an 
53 Glied et al. (2003) look at small firms with less than 100 workers, mid-sized firms, and large firms with 
500 or more workers.  Garrett et al. (2001) look at the smallest firms (less than 10 employees).
54 The 2004 Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust survey provides similar 
results.
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increase in the percent offering health insurance.  This finding also holds for firms with 
25-99 and 1000 or more employees (AHRQ 2000 and 2005).  
2.2.2.  Recruitment and Retention.  While financial reasons appear to deter small 
businesses from offering health insurance, the primary reasons to offer coverage appear 
to be employee recruitment and retention.55 The tightness of the labor market faced by 
employers can also influence their reactions to rising health care costs.  That is, while 
small employers may be facing rising health insurance costs they may be reluctant to 
drop coverage if they are also facing a tight labor market.  If labor markets are not tight 
and unemployment is high, employers may not see the value of offering health insurance 
in order to attract workers.  Marquis and Long (2001a) find that small firms with 50 
employees or less are more likely to offer health insurance in areas with low 
unemployment.  Since the tightness of the labor market has been shown to affect the 
small business’ decision to offer health insurance, our models will include controls for 
unemployment rates. 
Nichols et al. (1997) point out that employers in specific industries or 
occupational categories compete for workers in distinct labor markets.  Therefore, this 
may influence the decision to offer insurance by employers in these markets.  Small 
businesses may be concentrated in industries and occupations where health benefits are 
not necessary to attract good workers.  Marquis and Long (2001a) also find small 
employers are more likely to offer insurance if the local market is characterized by a 
smaller share of workers in regulated industries.  
55 Various surveys offer support for these motivating factors (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2008; 
Fronstin et al., 2003; Holve et al., 2003).  Also see Currie and Madrian (1999).
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Additional characteristics of the employer or its local market may also influence 
the decision to offer insurance.56 Using MSA-level data from the 1993 National 
Employer Health Insurance Survey and the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Employer Health Insurance Survey, Marquis and Long (2001a) find that small 
employers’ decision to offer ESI is influenced by local market conditions.  More 
specifically, they find small employers are more likely to offer insurance in markets with 
more unionization, a greater share of workers in big business, and less concentration in 
the labor market.
2.3  Insurance markets and products
2.3.1.  Access.  Young businesses, which are small, may not have access to 
insurance.57 This is because insurers will not offer policies until they are sure the 
business has not been established in order to get coverage for individuals with poor 
health.  Young businesses may face access issues related to insurer reluctance or their 
own concerns regarding survivability.  The percent of establishments offering insurance 
is smallest in the youngest firms (less than 5 years) at less than 28 percent in 2005 and 
largest in the oldest firms (20 years or older) at almost 67 percent (AHRQ 2005).  As 
noted earlier, the largest significant decrease from 2000 to 2005 in the percent of 
establishments offering health insurance belonged to the youngest firms.
56 For example, Morrisey et al. (1994) find that small businesses (50 employees or less) that are 
incorporated are more likely than unincorporated businesses to offer health insurance.  The authors also 
find that small employers located in urban areas are more likely to offer this benefit than employers in rural 
locations.  
57 Surveying businesses with less than 50 workers in 1993, Morrisey et al. (1994) find access is not an issue 
in this earlier time period, perhaps because consolidation in the insurance industry and state-level reforms 
had not yet taken place.
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Small employers may also have limited access to insurance carriers due to the 
dwindling number in the small group market, although this market has been described as 
the most profitable area of the health insurance industry (Abelson 2009).  Table 2.7 
shows the number of carriers by state.  To avoid risk and adverse selection, some insurers 
may not cover workers in small businesses or employers in some industries.  In addition, 
some may not cover businesses with less than 10 workers and some insurers impose 
exclusions on pre-existing conditions.  Businesses also cannot purchase health insurance 
from carriers in other states, which prevents interstate competition (Neese, 2009).58
Small businesses can also face limited choices for insurers if insurers leave states where 
they believe they cannot be competitive (Carpenter, 2003).59
GAO (2009) provides 2008 survey results on the number and market share of 
carriers in the small group health insurance market by state (see Table 2.7).60 While the 
median number of carriers is 27, North Dakota has 10 carriers and market share for the 
largest carrier is 91 percent.  In contrast, Arizona has 32 carriers and New York has 31.  
Focusing on our four states, it is interesting to note that the number of carriers does not 
always reveal market share for the largest carrier.  That is, although Tennessee has 33 
58 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners and The Center for Insurance Policy and 
Research, however, argue that allowing interstate sales would allow insurers to chose states and associated 
regulations.  This would help insurers to pursue those with the healthiest risk and potentially raising 
premium costs for others.  
59 Blue Cross Blue Shield provides the majority of coverage for small businesses (Actuarial Research 
Corporation, 2003).  This report looks at different data sources using different size definitions and suggests 
reasons why fewer insurers may lead to lower costs since the remaining carriers have higher market shares 
and economies of scale. These economies can be realized in the processing of claims and enrollment data.  
With fewer competitors, marketing needs and associated costs are reduced.  Finally, lower commissions 
may be realized also from the reduced need for underwriting since fewer insurers leads to reduced turnover 
among insurers for small business coverage.  
60 Market share is usually based on the number of covered lives (GAO 2009).  GAO (2009) defines a 
carrier as an entity (either an insurer or managed health care plan) that bears the risk for and administers a 
range of health benefit offerings.  33 of the 47 responding states defined small group as 2 to 50 employees, 
12 states defined small as 1 to 50 employees, and the remaining states used other definitions (GAO 2009).
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carriers, market share for the largest in the small group market is 68 percent.  With 
comparable numbers of carriers, New York (31 carriers) and Arizona (32 carriers) have 
market shares for their top carriers equal to 26 percent and 21 percent, respectively.  Part 
of the explanation may be related to the largest Blue Cross and Blue Shield carrier in both 
North Dakota and Tennessee being ranked number one, whereas they are ranked number 
two in New York and Arizona.  Across the country, Blue Cross and Blue Shield is named 
the top carrier in 36 of the 44 responding states.  
This GAO (2009) report also compared findings with previous reports done in 
2002 and 2005.  These comparisons provide evidence of increased concentration of 
carriers in the small group health insurance market.  While the largest small group carrier 
had a median market share of 33 percent in 2002 and 43 percent in 2005, this rose to 47 
percent in 2008.  
2.3.2.  Insurance options with lower premium costs.  High-deductible or 
consumer-directed health plans may provide a lower cost option for small businesses to 
provide ESI,61 because they are generally associated with lower premium costs.  High 
deductible health plans are an important feature of consumer-directed health plans and 
often combined with personal health savings accounts or health savings accounts.62
Some report, however, that consumer-directed health plans have not improved access or 
affordability of health insurance for small businesses (KRI, 2007).  
61 Consumer-directed health plans force consumers to be more financially aware and responsible when 
seeking health care services, especially costly ones.  The idea is that this should lead to less expensive 
insurance coverage and possible lower health care costs.
62 Health savings accounts allow individuals to place pretax earnings in an account from which they can 
pay for deductibles and copayments.
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After their introduction, health savings accounts appeared more popular with 
small businesses but have been adopted more by large employers in recent years (KRI, 
2007).  According to the National Small Business Association’s 2003 Benefits Survey of 
256 business owners, 73 percent of small businesses report interest in health savings 
accounts (Gencarelli, 2005), other surveys find that small businesses are less likely to 
keep consumer-directed health plan offerings from year to year (Gates et al. 2007).  
While benefits under health savings accounts and high-deductible health plans offered in 
small and large firms have been found to be quite similar, annual deductibles are a bit 
higher in small firms (America’s Health Insurance Plans, 2006).
Small employers and insurers have reported that educating and communicating 
with employees about the benefits of high-deductible health plans is important for take up 
(Gates et al. 2007), yet small employers may not have the resources to promote these 
lower cost options.  Another factor may be how small employers gather information 
about health insurance options.  As noted earlier, evidence suggests small employers 
consult with brokers and agents about coverage.  These individuals have little incentive to 
promote low cost options, since this would lower their commissions that are based on 
premiums.  
2.4 Health Insurance Regulatory Environment 
2.4.1  Legislation, insurance offers, and business size.  It is important to understand 
the regulatory environment for the small group insurance market.  These factors can 
influence employers’ decisions to provide coverage and the premium costs they face.  Of 
particular interest to our analyses are findings that regulations may influence small 
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business growth.  Decisions regarding benefits and size can subsequently impact the 
small businesses’ ability to compete in the labor market against large employers and the 
growth and survival of small businesses.  
In KRI (2007), Gates and Leuschner point out that basically no research has 
examined the impact of health insurance regulation on business size and suggest how 
these laws may influence the growth of small businesses.  For example, small businesses 
may not want to grow beyond a particular size, that is, the size at which legislation no 
longer protects small business health insurance coverage.  These may be firms with high 
expected health care costs that value the access and breadth of coverage provided under 
reform even at a higher premium cost (Kapur et al. 2006).   Alternatively, some small
businesses may wish to grow large enough in order to self-insure and avoid state 
regulations on small business coverage that may potentially raise premiums and reduce 
availability.  This latter response may be particularly true for small firms with young, 
healthy workers who have low expected health care costs and high turnover and therefore 
do not value coverage offered under reform (Kapur 2004; KRI, 2007).63
Researchers find that small businesses do increase their size to avoid the more 
regulated small group market (KRI, 2007).  Firms with a size close to the threshold in the 
regulations more easily adjusted their size to avoid the reforms (Kapur et al. 2006) and 
many states adjusted their thresholds.  During the initial surge in state-level small group
health insurance reform in the early 1990s, most states had 25 or 50 employees as the 
upper size threshold.  By 1997, states had raised their thresholds and no state had 25 as 
the upper threshold any longer (Kapur et al. 2006).
63 Kapur (2004) defines a small firm as having less than 25 workers.
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Similar to our study, the research presented in this section examines the growth of 
small businesses.  But the focus in these studies is on the influence of regulations and 
regulatory thresholds on changes in business size, whereas our work will focus on the 
impact of rising health care costs proxied using insurance offers on the growth of small 
businesses.  In addition, our research will focus on the post-reform period of the 1990s 
using more recent data from the MEPS-IC and longitudinal information available from 
the Longitudinal Business Database.  This past research, however, highlights the potential 
influence of workforce characteristics and the regulatory environment faced by small 
businesses and the importance of analytical models including controls for these factors. 
2.4.2 State reform.  Many states passed reform measures during the 1990s to 
improve small businesses’ access and affordability to health insurance, including 
guaranteed-issue and guaranteed-renewal laws, pre-existing condition exclusion laws, 
portability reforms, premium rating reforms, and reinsurance provisions. 64 These 
reforms help small businesses by restricting the use of health status in determining 
premiums; however, claims experience and the health characteristics of subscribers do 
still lead to wide variations in state premiums (GAO 1995).  The Health Insurance 
64 Under the Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and state law, insurance 
plans sold to small employers with 2 to 50 employees are sold as guaranteed issue and insurers cannot deny 
these small businesses coverage based upon health status of workers.  Guaranteed renewal means the small 
employer may continue to renew health insurance benefits at their own discretion and prohibits insurers 
from denying coverage except under certain conditions including unpaid premiums or fraud.  Pre-existing 
condition exclusions refers to an individual having specified medical conditions existing 6 months prior to 
enrollment, and these conditions would not be covered or excluded from coverage up to 12 months after 
enrollment.  Under portability provisions, insured individuals changing employers would not have these 
conditions excluded from coverage.  Under premium rating, rules are established identifying which 
characteristics of covered individuals may or may not be used to set premiums.  Reinsurance has been 
called the insurance for insurance companies and refers to insurance companies protect themselves from 
the risk of losses by using other insurance companies.
32
Association of America estimates that 2 to 4 percent of premium costs are associated with 
guaranteed issue requirements (KRI, 2007).  These reforms as well as mandated 
benefits65 have been found by some to increase the price of health insurance (Kaestner 
and Simon 2002; Neese 2009) with the highest premium costs found in the most highly 
regulated states (Neese 2009).  In general, however, health insurance regulations have 
been found to have little effect on premiums or coverage (KRI, 2007; Monheit and 
Schone 2003; Buchmueller and DiNardo 2002).
On the other hand, the impact of these regulations may not be truly realized if it is 
difficult for states to enforce the laws (Abelson 2009) or small businesses are unaware of 
the legislation intended to increase the affordability and accessibility of ESI.  The 2002 
Small Employer Health Benefits Survey66 found more than 60 percent of small 
businesses (2-50 workers) did not know that insurers could not refuse to provide 
coverage even if the health status of the employers’ workforce is poor (Fronstin et al. 
2003).67 The authors point out that this lack of knowledge among small employers could 
lead to lower offer rates.
As discussed earlier, our empirical model will control for the location of a small 
business since different states have different health insurance regulatory environments 
and costs.  In 2006, the Council for Affordable Health Insurance (CAHI) developed an 
65 States can pass regulations requiring health insurance plans to cover certain medical conditions, 
treatments, and health care providers.
66 This survey defines small businesses as those with 2 to 50 employees and in 2002 conducted telephone 
surveys with 502 companies with health benefits and 498 companies without health benefits (Fronstin et 
al., 2003).  The survey is co-sponsored by Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Employee Benefit 
Research Institute, and the Consumer Health Education Council.  The authors admit to being unable to 
quantify errors associated with sampling, nonresponse, and survey design.  Despite these possible 
shortcomings, the survey provides some information on small employers unavailable elsewhere (e.g., their 
knowledge of tax advantages for offering insurance).  
67 The authors break this down further reporting that 60 percent of those offering coverage were unaware 
versus 68 percent of small businesses (2 to 50 workers) not offering coverage (Fronstin et al. 2003).
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index (maximum 100 points for best score) that provides an indication of the health 
insurance environment in each state (Matthews et al. 2006).  Six factors are used to 
calculate the index measure: 1) Percent uninsured (10 points maximum for low 
percentage), 2) Number of state mandates (10 points maximum for low number), 3) State 
regulatory environment (20 points maximum), 4) High risk pools (20 points maximum),
5) Premiums in individual market (20 points maximum), 6) Premiums in small group 
market (20 points maximum).
States with a high index score are expected to have a competitive health insurance 
market and lower premiums, while states with low scores indicating an unattractive 
health insurance environment are expected to have fewer insurers and higher premiums.  
Figure 2.6 shows the ranges for this index by state.  This map shows that the lowest index 
scores are seen only in states in the Northeast.  New York has the lowest score with 5, 
and premium costs for single coverage among the highest (over $4200 per 2005 MEPS-
IC).68 The highest index scores are primarily found in the West and Midwest regions of 
the country.  Contrary to expectations (Matthews et al., 2006), North Dakota has one of 
the highest CAHI scores with 75, but relatively low premiums of $3,438.  This state’s 
premium costs are $553 less than the national average in 2005 based on MEPS-IC data 
and may reflect other factors not captured in the index.  
68 Arizona and Tennessee have lower scores with 45 and 35, respectively.  Like New York, Arizona has 
premium costs for single coverage over $4,200.  In contrast, Tennessee with its lower score also has lower 
than premium costs (i.e., $3,822), which is below the national average of $3,991.  Premium costs based on 
MEPS-IC data.  
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2.4.3.  Health Insurance Mandates.  Some states mandate insurance policies cover 
particular health care services, providers, and persons.69 While this legislation can 
increase the comprehensiveness of policies, they can also increase costs and discourage 
businesses from offering insurance to workers. 70,71 According to the Council for 
Affordable Health Insurance (2005), approximately 100 different mandates exist and total 
over 1,800 when summed across states.  Mandates for mental health parity and 
prescription drugs are each estimated to contribute 5 to 10 percent to premium costs, 
while in vitro fertilization and coverage for dentists each have estimated costs of 3 to 5 
percent.  22 of the mandates have estimated costs of 1 to 3 percent, while the balance of 
the mandates have estimated costs less than 1 percent.  Figure 2.7 shows the number of 
mandated benefits by their cost estimate for each state (Bunce and Wieske, 2005)72 and a 
cost-weighted index.73
Figure 2.7 illustrates that differences in the costs of mandates can impact the 
financial burden of employers differently regardless of the number of mandates.  For 
example, the cost-weighted index for Arizona and North Dakota are very close at 46.5 
69 Some mandated coverage may be typical and likely to be contained in a standard insurance policy.
70 Many employers would offer benefits even if not mandated (GAO 2003).  If plans voluntarily offer the 
mandated benefits, it is difficult to evaluate the additional cost to premiums attributed to state mandates.
71 Gruber (1994) finds that mandates increase premium costs by a small percentage, while other researchers 
find a larger effect.  Lee (2002) notes that Gruber’s analysis was conducted in the early 1990s before many 
mandates had been passed by states, but that work in this area by others was methodologically weaker than 
Gruber’s.
72 The cost-range estimates are calculated as if the mandate were added to a comprehensive family policy 
that did not include the coverage (Bunce and Wieske, 2005).  The authors caution that each piece of 
mandate legislation needs to be fully evaluated in detail as well as other regulations in order to determine 
the impact of mandates in an individual state.  
73 The cost-weighted index is calculated for each state by summing across the number of mandated benefits 
contributing 5 to 10 percent multiplied by a weight of 7.5, the number contributing 3 to 5 percent 
multiplied by a weight of 4, the number contributing 1 to 3 percent by a weight of 2, and those contributing 
less than 1 percent by a weight of 1.  Estimates of the percent contributed towards costs by the mandates 
are from Bunce and Wieske (2005).  
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and 47.5, respectively.  However, Arizona has legislated only 28 mandates compared to 
33 for North Dakota.   
Pierron and Fronstin (2008) report that small firms are less likely to offer 
insurance because of the cost added to coverage as a result of state mandates and small 
employers are more price sensitive than large employers.74 18 percent of small 
businesses without coverage would likely sponsor coverage but for mandates (Jensen and 
Morrisey 1999), and other studies provide similar results (Gabel and Jensen 1989; Jensen 
and Gabel 1992).75 Some states have passed legislation to bypass concerns that 
mandates may make health insurance less affordable for small employers, including 
allowing small employers to offer plans exempt from premium taxes and not covering 
mandated benefits (Gencarelli 2005).  States have the primary responsibility in 
overseeing policies sold by insurers, however, and a lot of variation may be seen across 
states in mandated benefits and regulations on premiums.  
State insurance mandates may also impact the growth of small businesses, 
although little research has been conducted to study this.  The only known study is 
Mathur (2008), which uses demographic rather than business data and the data pre-dates 
the passage of mandate legislation in a number of states.  Using the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation data from 1993-1995, Mathur finds that the probability that a 
self-employed person will be a significant employment generator decreases with the 
74 The authors look at firms of different sizes: 3-1999, 200-999, 1,000-4,999, and 5,000 or more employees.
75 The results of studies examining the effect of mandates on insurance coverage, offers, and premiums 
show a small effect or no effect (Sloan and Conover 1998; Jensen and Morrisey 1999; Zecherman and 
Rajan 1999; Monheit and Schone 2004;  Buchmueller and DiNardo 2002; Marquis and Long 2001a, 
2001b) or modest effects in different directions (Uccello 1996; Hing and Jensen 1999; Simon 2005; 
Buchmueller and Jensen 1997).  
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number of health insurance mandates in a state.76 The author finds that the probability of 
owning a business with at least one employee goes down about 10 percentage points (i.e., 
from 0.45 to 0.34) as the number of mandates increases from 0 to 16.  This change in 
mandates reduces the probability of owning a firm with more than 2 employees by almost 
50 percent and owning a firm with 6 or more employees by about 35 percent.
2.5  Concluding Remarks
While rising health care costs can impact the insurance premium cost for small 
employers, other costs associated with risk factors and plan administration can raise the 
cost of ESI.  As stated in the 2009 Council of Economic Advisors Report to the President, 
higher costs can make ESI prohibitively expensive for small employers and lead them to 
not offer this benefit.  If small employers are unable to afford offering health insurance to 
workers or can only offer plans at a much higher cost than larger employers, this can put 
them at a disadvantage for recruiting and retaining skilled workers who could impact 
their growth and survival.
The focus of our empirical analysis is on the growth and survival of small 
businesses and not the reasons for offering health insurance.  However, because offering 
health insurance may be endogenous in the model predicting business performance, we 
predict offers of health insurance using the MEPS-IC, which is the premier data source 
on employer-sponsored insurance.  Unlike some studies, we use predicted premiums to 
predict the offers in order to develop the cost faced by both offering and non-offering 
76 Mathur finds these results hold when models control for the total sum of mandates or using a cost 
weighted measure of the most expensive mandates.
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businesses.  As highlighted in this chapter, employee demand for insurance can also 
factor into the decision to offer this benefit and workforce characteristics are included in 
the models.  Finally, given the potential influences of the small group insurance market 
and the regulatory environment, our models control for the business’s geographic 
location.  
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3.  Employer Reactions to Rising Health Care Costs
Employers may adopt different business strategies when faced with rising 
compensation costs associated with health insurance.  These include dropping coverage 
altogether, eliminating coverage for particular health care services, increasing employee 
cost sharing or switching to premium reimbursement, or reducing labor inputs.  Adoption 
of one or more of these approaches may impact the growth and survival of small 
businesses if these strategies reduce productivity and/or worker morale.
3.1  Discontinuing health insurance benefits
Rising premium costs may lead to some employers dropping ESI to workers 
altogether (Morrisey, et al. 1994) or small employers to never provide this benefit.  Since 
ESI is the primary source of coverage for people in the U.S., lack of coverage through 
small employers can exacerbate the nation’s concerns regarding the uninsured and access 
to health care.  A 2008 Kaiser Family Foundation report states that more than half the 
uninsured are employees and dependents of small businesses.77
Just as the regulatory environment across states can vary, health care expenditures 
and coverage rates can also vary.  In a macro-level examination, workers in states with 
higher per capita healthcare expenditures are found to be less likely to lack private health 
insurance coverage (Econometrica 2007).  The percent increase in per capita personal 
health care expenses by state of residence from 2000 to 2004 varies from a low of 26 
77 More than 60 percent of the 43.6 million uninsured are from families headed by someone working for a 
small business or self-employed (Carpenter, 2003).  The author notes that definitions of small can vary 
from less than 50 to less than 500 employees.  
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percent to a high of 44 percent.  The increase during this time period for the entire U.S. is 
30.8 percent (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid and U.S. Department of Commerce, 
2007).  The percent increase in the four states we are following are a bit higher than this 
national average.  North Dakota has the largest increase at 37 percent, while New York 
has the lowest increase at 32 percent.  These differences may relate to variations in the 
efficiency of the state’s health care delivery system (Baicker and Chandra, 2009). 
While health care and premium costs have been rising, offer rates by small 
employers have not decreased dramatically.  Carpenter (2003) suggests the drop in 
employers offering coverage may have not been dramatic because employers do not want 
to reduce worker morale or productivity and may not want to make hiring more difficult.  
Research by Short and Lesser (2002) also suggests that while small employers may not 
drop coverage, they may raise employee out-of-pocket costs (e.g., deductibles, 
copayments), switch products and carriers, and/or reduce benefits.  Workers at small 
firms have been found to be more likely to face deductibles than workers at larger firms 
and the deductibles tend to be higher in small firms (Gabel et al., 2006: Morrisey et al., 
1994).    
Projections on small employers dropping coverage were included in the Council 
of Economic Advisors’ 2009 report to the President.  They project less than 20 percent of 
small employers78 will offer coverage by 2040.  This is a decrease from 43.4 percent of 
employers this size offering health insurance in 2005 based on MEPS-IC estimates 
(AHRQ, 2005).79
78 The report defines small employers as those with less than 50 workers.
79 From a different perspective, the 2002 Small Employer Health Benefits Survey revealed than 11 percent 
of small employers not offering health insurance benefits are either extremely or very likely to start 
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As discussed earlier, small businesses may offer health insurance to recruit and 
retain employees.  However, high costs can lead to small employers not offering this 
benefit.  This may disadvantage small businesses in competition with large employers for 
skilled workers, who could potentially make a positive impact on the growth and survival 
of the small business. 
3.2  Reducing Benefits
Small employers may try to combat rising health care costs by reducing benefits 
(Short and Lesser, 2002).80 For example, these businesses may drop coverage for fertility 
treatment, reduce coverage for mental illness, discontinue retiree health insurance 
benefits, and extend the waiting period for employee eligibility.  GAO (2001) also reports 
that workers covered by small firms are less likely to receive prescription drug coverage, 
prenatal care, out-patient and inpatient mental health, well-baby care, adult physicals, 
chiropractic care, oral contraceptives, and acupuncture. 81.82 Another strategy establishes 
three-tiered drug cost sharing for prescription drugs (Short and Leser, 2002).  Finally, 
employers may respond to rising health insurance costs by reducing non-insurance 
benefits.  For example, businesses may cut back on benefits such as vacation time rather 
than reducing employment and/or hours.  By offering less generous benefit packages, 
small businesses may be at a disadvantage in attracting skilled workers.
offering them in the next two years and 22 percent are somewhat likely to start offering them (Fronstin et 
al. 2003).  However, the authors also report that 66 percent of small employers not offering benefits are not 
likely to offer them in the next 2 years.
80 Small is defined as less than 50 employees (Short and Lesser, 2002).
81 Gruber (2000) points out that traditionally small employers offer less generous plans.
82 As discussed earlier, small businesses in some states may be mandated to cover particular services in 
plans offered.
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3.3  Increasing employee contributions towards premiums
While some employers may discontinue benefits or reduce the generosity of 
health plans offered, others may increase the employee’s out-of-pocket expense of health 
insurance when faced with rising premium costs associated with escalating health care 
costs (Short and Lesser, 2002; Gabel and Pickreign 2004). 83 According to a 2008 report 
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 36 percent of small companies84 (3 to 50 
employees) stated that in the future they are likely to no longer pay for any portion of 
health insurance benefits for their workers.  Increasing the employee’s financial burden 
for insurance can potentially lower their morale and reduce their work performance, 
hindering the ultimate growth and survival of a small business.  
In 2000 and 2005, employees at smaller establishments actually contribute less for 
single coverage than employees at the larger firms in both levels and as a percent of 
premium costs (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  Based on MEPS-IC data, the average total 
employee contribution for single coverage in establishments belonging to the smallest 
firms in 2005 are $577 and $657 for small firms with 10-24 employees.  Average 
contributions in this same year for the largest firms are $737, which is significantly 
greater than the contributions required in the smallest firms.85 As Figure 3.1 shows, 
83 By adopting this strategy, small employers may reduce participation rates in offered health plans below 
required minimums.  Minimum participation rates may be required to reduce the risk of adverse selection 
and these rates can be required by insurers to ensure a large enough risk pool.
84 Defined as 3 to 50 employees (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2008).
85 This pattern also holds for 2000 and 2005 when small businesses with less than 50 employees are 
compared with those with 50 or more workers.  
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employee contributions for single coverage increased from 2000 to 2005 across all firm 
sizes and increases for single coverage are smaller than the increases for family coverage.  
Figure 3.2 shows the percent of the premium cost contributed by employees.  In 
2005, employees from firms with less than 10 workers and 10-24 workers contribute 
approximately 13 percent and 16 percent of premium costs for single coverage, 
respectively.  In this same year, employees from establishments belonging to the largest 
firms contribute about 18.6 percent of the premium cost, which is significantly different 
from the percent contributed by employees in the smallest firms.86 Figure 3.2 shows that 
the percent contributed by employees for single coverage remained virtually the same for 
the smallest and largest firm sizes from 2000 to 2005.  Short and Lesser (2002) find that 
more small employers switch to a fixed dollar contribution towards premiums rather than 
contributing a percentage of the premium cost.  With this approach, the employee is then 
picking up the burden of increases in the premium cost.   
Contributions required may also vary by wages, which are generally lower in 
small firms.  In both 2000 and 2005 and across all firm sizes, the MEPS-IC data shows 
the percent of the premium for single coverage contributed by employees in low-wage 
establishments is greater than the percent contributed by employees in high-wage 
establishments.87 The differences, however, grow smaller from 2000 to 2005 in the 
smallest firms (see Figure 3.3).  
Though uncommon, a some small employers require little or no premium cost 
sharing from employees.  Occasionally small employers may adopt this practice in order 
86 Again, this pattern holds for 2000 and 2005 and also when small businesses with less than 50 employees 
are compared with those with 50 or more workers.
87 The 2003 report for the Small Business Administration shows this same pattern.
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to offer a competitive insurance program, to meet minimum participation requirements,88
to give employees the benefits of tax-sheltered compensation, and/or to avoid adverse 
selection concerns.    Zawacki and Taylor (2005) find that small employers are far more 
likely than large employers to require no contribution towards the premium cost from 
employees.  A very linear pattern is observed between firm size and establishments that 
offer insurance offering a plan requiring no employee contribution (see Figure 3.4).  
These patterns hold in both 2000 and 2005 and for both single and family coverage 
(AHRQ 2000 and 2005).  
Employers may be more reluctant to change single coverage benefits, which may 
be workers’ only source of coverage for themselves, than family coverage.  In their study 
of smaller employers’ responses to increasing premium costs, Short and Lesser (2002) 
find that employers may eliminate family coverage when insurance costs increase.  Other 
small employers may adjust their cost sharing for family plans.  Figure 3.1 shows that the
average total employee contribution for family coverage has increased considerably from 
2000 to 2005 for all firm sizes.  In establishments belonging to the smallest firms, the 
increase has been smaller than for all other firm sizes.  
The percent of the premium cost for family coverage contributed by the employee 
in the smallest firms actually decreased significantly from 23.9 percent in 2000 to 19.7 
percent in 2005 (See Figure 3.2).89 The decrease from 2000 to 2005 in the percent of 
establishments offering at least one plan requiring no employee contribution for family 
88 Insurers’ minimum participation requirements may require a certain number of an employer’s workers to 
enroll and may set employer contribution amounts (including no employee contribution) to help meet this 
requirement.
89 In establishments belonging to firms with less than 50 employees (data not shown), MEPS-IC estimates 
show the percent of total premiums contributed by employees enrolled in family coverage at private-sector 
establishments remained the same at 27.6 percent from 2000 to 2005.  Using this definition for small firms, 
the percent contributed by employees in smaller firms dropped.  
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coverage is greatest for those belonging to the smallest firms at almost 9 percentage 
points (see Figure 3.4).  In contrast, the decrease is less than one half percentage points 
for establishments belonging to the largest firms (AHRQ 2000 and 2005).    
While some employers may respond to rising health care costs by discontinuing 
direct offers of ESI, they may provide premium reimbursement.  This compensates 
employees purchasing health insurance on their own rather than through a business.  An 
employee might purchase non-group coverage or use the funds towards the premium cost 
of a spouse’s plan.   In 2007, about 34 percent of small businesses dropping direct 
provision of benefits in the previous 3 years moved to premium reimbursement and about 
10 percent of small employers offering health insurance offer premium reimbursement 
(Dennis 2007).   
3.4  Labor market responses
Higher premium costs for employers offering insurance to employees raise the 
fixed costs of employment, and businesses can choose from among different strategies to 
cope with rising costs.  As discussed earlier, economic theory posits that employers pass 
along the cost of health insurance to workers in the form of reduced wages.  Since many 
small firms have a large proportion of low-wage workers, minimum wage constraints 
prevent the employer from reducing wages below a certain level.  High premium costs, 
therefore, can potentially create a greater financial burden for low wage firms.  
While reduced wages may be evidenced in the long run in firms of any size, rising 
costs may lead to changes in the labor market in the short run.  With compensation costs 
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representing a larger share of business expenses, owners may offset this by reducing 
labor inputs.  For example, employers may decrease employment, have employees work 
more hours rather than increasing employment, use more part-time or temporary workers, 
and/or increase reliance on outsourcing.  Baicker and Chandra (2005) show this using 
employer as well as household data.  Findings indicate that rising premium costs affect 
both the number and structure of jobs, including reductions in employment and 
converting full-time workers with benefits to part-time status without insurance.
Since part-time and temporary employees are generally less likely to be offered or 
eligible for ESI (Morrisey et al., 1994), employers may react to rising health care costs by 
hiring more workers under part-time or temporary status.  Baicker and Chandra (2006) 
find that a 10 percent increase in premiums increases the likelihood that a worker is 
employed only part-time by 1.9 percentage points.90 Buchmueller (1999) finds that firms 
that offer more generous fringe benefits make greater use of low wage part-time workers, 
while no significant relationship is found between these benefits and the proportion of 
high-wage workers employed part-time.  Regarding temporary workers, 2.4 million 
people worked for temporary agencies in July of 2004, an increase of 9 percent from a 
year earlier according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Porter, 2004).
Since health insurance benefits are a fixed cost, some employers may react to 
rising health care costs by keeping the same number of employees but increasing the 
number of hours worked by employees.  Cutler and Madrian (1998) found rising health 
insurance costs in the 1980s led to employees with health insurance working more hours.  
The authors also cite work by Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982) who find a 10 percent 
90 Buchmueller (1999) and Schultz and Doorn (2009) find similar patterns.
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increase in fringe benefit costs leads to a 5 to 17 percent increase in overtime hours per 
worker.  
Another labor market approach that employers may adopt involves who they hire.  
As noted earlier, small employers may be reluctant to offer health insurance because
premiums can vary greatly from year to year.  Part of this variation may be attributable to 
the health status of their workers.  Kapur (2004) notes that small firms may try to reduce 
premium variability by maintaining a workforce that is comprised of workers who have 
low expected health costs.  If inquiries are related to a prospective employee’s ability to 
perform a job, employers with less than 15 workers can inquire about employee health.  
Larger employers are unable to obtain this health information per the 1990 Americans 
with Disabilities Act.  Evidence suggests small91 insured firms are less likely to employ 
workers with conditions likely leading to denial of insurance coverage or workers with 
families that had conditions that led to higher premiums compared to large insured firms 
(Kapur, 2004).  Since decision making is quite centralized in a small business, Kapur 
notes that it is relatively easy for an entrepreneur to screen out individuals with high 
expected health costs.  This hiring strategy may relate to findings cited earlier showing 
small businesses are more likely than larger businesses to have younger (i.e., healthier) or 
older (i.e., Medicare-eligible) workers.
Wages and Health Insurance Offering
Currie and Madrian (1999) provide a concise discussion on both the theoretical 
and empirical models of the relationships between health insurance and wage levels.  
91 Less than 25 workers (Kapur, 2004).
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Most models are done in a compensating differential framework.  That is, firms compete 
for workers in a competitive market and provide a total compensation package (wages 
and benefits) that is high enough to attract workers but not so high that it drives the firm 
out of business.  Because benefits are costly to the firm, the wages offered will be lower 
by the cost of the benefit to the firm.  The end result is that firms competing in the same 
labor pool offer a spectrum of total compensation packages differing in their mixtures of 
wages and benefits - and firms offering higher benefits offer lower wages.  Workers then 
sort themselves across the firms according to their wage and benefit preferences.
A number of explanations have been offered to explain the lack of empirical 
evidence for a wage-benefit tradeoff.  The simplest is that it requires very specialized 
data to capture.  Current empirical studies are forced to rely on proxies and estimates for 
several key variables, limiting their ability to capture the relationship. These studies  
have found either no evidence of a wage-benefit tradeoff or at best mixed results.92 The 
main evidence found in favor of the model is that changes in health insurance status may 
be correlated with changes in wages but Currie and Madrian (1999) raise concerns over 
their ability to control for serious simultaneity issues.
Similar difficulties have been faced in the pension literature and an alternative 
explanation borrowed from that literature is that while employees may be willing to 
accept wage reductions for more generous insurance packages, they would not be 
sympathetic to the idea of lowering their wages to offset higher administrative costs faced 
by the employing firm – and these costs are a major component of the total cost of 
insurance faced by particularly small employers.  This would potentially drive a wedge 
92 Leibowitz (1983), Ehrenberg (1971), Buchmueller and Lettau (1997), Olson (1992), Miller (1995), Ryan 
(1997)
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between the costs paid by the firm for health insurance and the wage reduction accepted 
in the labor market.
An alternative explanation offered by Currie and Madrian for the positive correlation 
observed between wage levels and health insurance coverage is that some firms choose to 
employ higher ability workers and must pay a higher level of total compensation to 
attract and retain their workers.  If the total compensation is split between wages and 
benefits, it would explain the positive correlation found in the empirical literature.  We 
believe that it also provides a plausible explanation for many of our findings.
3.5  Concluding Remarks
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that small businesses may adjust 
their benefit offerings or their labor demand in response to rising health insurance 
premium costs associated with escalating health care costs.  If the employer discontinues 
or decides not to offer insurance, or reduces covered benefits, or imposes more financial 
burden on the employee in the form of higher contributions towards premiums, this can 
result in the small business offering a compensation package that is less attractive than 
packages offered by large businesses.  If small businesses increase their reliance of part-
time workers or ask employees to work more hours, this may negatively impact on their 
performance and may reduce the probability that the small business will grow and 
survive.
Our empirical analyses help provide additional information on employer 
responses to rising health care costs both in how predicted premiums influence the 
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decision to offer insurance benefits and changes in business performance.  More 
specifically, performance is measured in our models using longitudinal data on size and 
payroll.  Our study builds upon the existing evidence presented in this chapter on labor 
market responses by examining whether rising health care costs result in changes in size 
and payroll, while controlling for the employer’s percent of workers who are part-time 
and workforce characteristics (e.g., percent of older workers, 50 years of age or older).
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4.  Growth and Survival of Small Businesses
This chapter begins with a discussion of factors other than rising health care costs 
that often affect the growth and survival of a small business - and how our analyses try to 
control for these influences.  In the following section of this chapter we look at the 
relationship between health insurance coverage and business performance.  Since most
businesses start out small, they warrant a separate discussion.  The last section, therefore, 
presents evidence on the role of firm age.  
4.1  Business Environment
A number of macro-patterns affected both business performance and the average 
likelihood of offering insurance.  Perhaps the most obvious is the general strength of the 
economy, which was weaker due to the recession during our study period resulting in 
lower overall demand.  The economic downturn may also have accelerated the decline of 
the manufacturing sector, which traditionally offered employees health insurance.  Firms 
in the faster  growing sectors of the economy, services and retail, are less likely to offer 
employees health insurance (Glied et al., 2003). Similarly, the erosion of unionization in 
the private sector from industry shifts and offshoring may have also impacted offers of 
ESI (Buchmueller et al., 2002 Fronstin, 2009).  Finally, employee age affects their 
demand for health insurance (Currie and Madrian 1999) and the age distribution of the 
U.S. workforce has been changing as baby boomers age.
We focus on the period from 2001 to 2005, which includes the National Bureau of 
Economic Research-dated recession from March 2001 to November 2001.  Davis et al. 
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(2006) report that job creation rates93 began to slide in late 1999 before the recession 
began and continued a long downward slide until mid-2003, well after the end of the 
recession.  In general, recessions have been characterized by increased job destruction 
and decreased job creation, particularly of less productive businesses (Davis et al., 1996; 
Davis and Haltiwanger 1999).  The economic downturn early in the decade may have 
meant small businesses were struggling, growing slower and closing more often.94
Also, the economic downturn in 2001 is associated with slower job growth, but 
higher unemployment could have helped small businesses hire qualified workers.  Using 
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to study job growth, Shierholz (2008) finds job 
growth was slower during the 2000s business cycle (i.e., only 0.6 percent per year) 
compared to an annual job growth averaging 1.8 percent during the 1990s.95 If 
businesses use insurance offering to lure better qualified, more productive workers, then 
the effects of the recession may have muted the differences in worker quality between 
businesses that offer insurance and those that do not.
Our analyses will include geography-based variables to control for a number of 
key effects.  For example, we use state dummies to control for differences in local 
insurance requirements and regulations.  We also use local employment growth and 
93 Davis et al. (1996) define gross job creation at time t to be equal to employment gains summed over all 
plants that expand or start up between t-1 and t.  The authors define gross job destruction at time t as 
employment losses summed over all plants that contract or shut down between t-1 and t.  Net job creation 
takes employment losses into account and equals the job creation rate minus the job destruction rate.
94A 2004 New York Times article discussing rising health insurance costs and the lack of job growth 
following the 2001 recession provides evidence of interest in this relationship.  In this article, Porter 
provides examples from various business owners on their increased use of temporary workers and the 
reluctance to hire more workers due to health insurance costs.  Based on interviews, Porter also points out 
that some industries with more generous benefits (e.g., manufacturing) than others (e.g., food service) may 
be more reluctant to invest in additional human capital and international competition may restrain capital 
investments.
95 The author measures the 2000 cycle from March 2001 to December 2007 (presumed peaks in business) 
and the 1990 cycle from July 1990 to March 2001 (Shierholz 2008).
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unemployment rates at various points of our analysis.  The potential influence from these 
factors are easy to illustrate.  Unemployment statistics provide a good example of how 
the business environment at the local level can vary leading to possible effects on job 
creation and employer demand for workers. There are fairly persistent differences in 
unemployment rates across states and metropolitan areas and these differences could be 
due to a wide range of local labor market factors like, for instance, more recession-proof 
industry mixes. For example, Figure 4.1 shows the unemployment rates of the Detroit,
Michigan and Bethesda, Maryland MSAs from 1991 to 2007.  There is clearly a large, 
persistent difference between the unemployment rates in the two metropolitan areas.  It 
ranges from -1.1% to -6.1% and averages -3.4% over the period.  We control for these 
types of factors by using local unemployment rates.
These persistent difference can also be observed at the state level. According to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. unemployment rose 1.2 percent from 2000 to 2005.  
While New York’s unemployment rate during this time period rose less than the national 
average or 0.7 percent, Tennessee’s unemployment rate rose 3 faster than New York’s 
(by 2.2 percent). Business success also often depends on local demand for its products –
particularly for the retail and service sector.  A recent study by Haltiwanger, Jarmin and 
Krizan (2010) showed that local market conditions (within 5 miles) were key factors to 
the success and survival of retail establishments. It is beyond the scope of this project to 
control for market forces at that level of detail.  Instead, we use local employment growth 
as a proxy for changes in local economic conditions, particularly demand.
In addition to economic fluctuations and health care costs rising over the decades, 
the industrial characteristics of the economy have been changing.  That is, the U.S. 
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economy has been moving away from manufacturing and towards service industries.96
The MEPS-IC frame reflects this shift.  According to estimates from the MEPS-IC, the 
number of establishments in mining and manufacturing dropped 10.5 percent from 2000
to 2005,97 and the number of employees in this sector decreased almost 18 percent 
(AHRQ 2000 and 2005).  In the past, establishments in the manufacturing sector have 
been more likely to offer health insurance than employers in most other sectors.98 This is 
true in 2000, when almost 78 percent of establishments in manufacturing offer health 
insurance but does not hold in 2005.  In this year, wholesale trade takes the lead with 
almost 72 percent of establishments offering health insurance, compared to 70 percent of 
manufacturing establishments (AHRQ 2000 and 2005).  In addition, Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999) summarize various U.S. studies and find that rates of job creation 
(and destruction) are often much higher for non-manufacturing than for the 
manufacturing sector.  Our empirical models will control for industry, which is 
particularly important given these changes in the economy.  
The movement away from the manufacturing sector also impacts unionization, 
since union workers are more likely to work in this sector.  Reduced unionization in the 
private sector impacts ESI offers because union workers are more likely to be offered 
benefits than nonunion workers (Buchmueller et al., 2002) and across all job 
characteristics (Fronstin, 2009).  With respect to small firms, the Survey of Income and 
96 This is easily seen in any time series of industry employment shares.  For example, according to County 
Business Pattern data, the share of manufacturing employment fell from about 16% in 1998 to about 11% 
in 2008.  (see http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html)
97 Davis et al. (1996) report that in 1988, manufacturing accounts for only 19 percent of U.S. employment.  
98 The shift away from manufacturing has been found to increase the share of uninsured in large firms 
(Glied et al., 2003).  
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Program Participation shows that 70 percent of union workers in small firms99 had ESI in 
their own name in 2007, compared with 38 percent among nonunion workers in small 
firms (Fronstin, 2009). 
Along with these changes in industrial sectors, many U.S. businesses may be 
outsourcing jobs to other countries to take advantage of less expensive manufacturing 
abilities.  This may change the makeup of the U.S. workforce in these plants and the 
influence of unions.  Evidence indicates that union-protected wages and benefits have 
eroded, especially for lower skilled industries (Econometrica 2007).  Historically
unionization was associated with a higher probability of insurance coverage 
(Buchmueller et al. 2002) and more generous benefits regardless of firm size.  Table 2.5, 
however, shows establishments with union workers and belonging to the smallest firms 
saw a large and significant decrease from 2000 to 2005 in the percent offering insurance 
from 62.6 percent to 42.1 percent (AHRQ 2000 and 2005).  Our study includes controls 
for whether or not the establishment is unionized to control for these effects.
Finally, the proportion of U.S. workers who are older (e.g., fifty years old or 
more) has increased (see Eberts and Hobbie, 2008 for a discussion of labor market 
trends), in large part by the aging of the baby boom cohort combined with increases in 
longevity.  The U.S. saw a 101 percent increase in the employment of workers 65 years 
of age or older from 1977 to 2007, as well as an increase in the full-time work status of 
older workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008).  Older individuals can be expected to 
have a higher demand for health insurance and while these individuals may be eligible for 
Medicare, many may also opt for ESI.  Older individuals are associated with higher 
99 Less than 25 workers.
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healthcare costs.  If a small business has primarily older workers this may lead to higher 
ESI costs than if they employed mostly younger, healthier workers.  Our model will 
include a measure for the percent of the establishment’s workers 50 years of age or older, 
since this may impact employee demand and an employer’s offers of insurance.
4.2  Small business origination and health insurance
Although business startups in the private-sector represent a small fraction of 
overall employment, they have been shown to be important for the creation of new jobs 
in the U.S. economy.  From 1980 to 2005, new firms in the private sector account for 
about 3 percent of employment per year100 and these are all new jobs (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2009a).  3 percent is large relative to the average annual net employment growth 
rate of about 1.8 percent for the entire private sector during this same time period (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2009a).  New or entrepreneurial firms have also been found to create 
positive externalities in the form of more employment in older, larger, incumbent firms 
(Van Praag and Versloot, 2007).  
Little research has been conducted on the relationship between entrepreneurship 
and health insurance. Results to date from studies examining concerns about health 
insurance in the transition from employment to self-employment have been mixed 
(Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, and Rosen 1996; Wellington 2001). The 1993 National 
Employer Health Insurance Survey shows that of the 4.5 million self-employed 
individuals with no employees, most had health insurance coverage.  38 percent had 
100 This percentage can be interpreted as the employment-weighted startup rate for the United States (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2009a).
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coverage through other employment-related sources mostly through a spouse and 28 
percent directly purchased health insurance and 5 percent had coverage through a public 
source.  The remaining 31 percent were uninsured (Allen and Park, 1999).101
An individual’s age in addition to access to health insurance coverage may be 
very important when examining who starts a business and its relationship to health care 
costs.  Based on the Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity, the 55-64 age group has 
the highest entrepreneurial activity from 2007 to 2008 (Fairlie, 2009).  Insurance 
coverage can be particularly valuable to these older individuals who may incur more 
health care costs than younger, healthier individuals.  
Because coverage is highly valued by older persons who may be in poorer health 
and incur more health care costs, they may be more likely to ensure they have coverage 
before venturing into starting a new business that can be fraught with business-related 
financial risks.  This is perhaps borne out by (Fairlie et al., 2009) who show having 
spousal insurance coverage or Medicare eligibility is related to an increase in business 
ownership and individuals with spousal coverage are more likely to start a new business 
than individuals with their own employer insurance.102 Part of the explanation for these 
findings may relate to individuals not wanting to lose their own ESI or take on business 
ownership without health insurance because even COBRA coverage would eventually 
end.  Other possible factors include the risk of incurring high health care costs if 
101 Forty-nine percent of respondents in a National Federation of Independent Business poll report 
providing insurance to give the owner the ability to obtain coverage through the business (Morrisey 2003).
The poll also finds that if the owner has coverage, there is a fifty percent chance that the business will offer 
coverage to employees.  If the owner does not have coverage, the business will almost never offer this 
benefit.
102 The 1993 National Employer Health Insurance Survey also shows that 86 percent of the self-employed 
without employees who had other employment related insurance obtained coverage from their spouse’s 
employment (Allen and Park, 1999).
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uninsured or they may not have coverage for pre-existing conditions or they may have to 
wait before eligible for coverage (Fairlie et al., 2009).
The self-employed are less likely to have health insurance than wage/salary, 
unemployed, and part-time workers (Fairlie et al., 2009).  High heath care costs can lead 
to prohibitively high premium costs in the individual market, which may be the only 
viable source of coverage for some self-employed persons who may not have spousal 
coverage.  As health care costs rise, this can only lead to even higher coverage costs for 
the self-employed, possibly affecting the growth and survival of their business venture.  
Lower cost insurance options introduced in recent years (e.g., consumer-directed 
health plans, health savings accounts), and greater tax deductibility for premium costs, 
however, may help increase coverage for the self-employed.  In 2003, self-employed 
individuals could begin deducting 100 percent of the health insurance premium costs 
from their taxes, previously in 1996 they could only deduct 30 percent.  Selden (2009) 
shows that this change increased private insurance coverage from 1.1 to 1.7 million self-
employed workers and their spouses.  In addition, this tax advantage has been shown to 
affect the survival of the business.  Gurley-Calvez (2006) finds that even the original 
legislation establishing the tax subsidy at only 25 percent for the self-employed positively 
affected entrepreneurial survival.  
While the focus of this monograph is to study the effect of health care costs 
proxied using insurance offers on the growth and survival of small businesses, it is
interesting to look at the relationship between health insurance and the hiring of workers 
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by the self-employed.103 While more recent business data may reveal different trends, 
household data from the 1993-1995 Survey of Income and Program Participation shows 
that if the self-employed business owner is insured, he is 11 percent more likely to 
employ 2 workers, 22 percent more likely to employ 3-5 workers, and 36 percent more 
likely to employ 6 or more workers (Mathur, 2008).104
4.3  Job growth and survival of young and small businesses 
As noted earlier, young businesses are usually small – but small businesses are 
either very young or very old (Haltiwanger, et al. 2009).  Young firms are more likely to 
close than are older firms but if they survive, young firms have higher employment 
growth rates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009c).  Our computations using the Census Bureau’s 
Business Dynamics Statistics data show that establishments belonging to firms less than 1 
year old have a net employment growth rate of 15 percent conditional on survival
compared to 4 percent for continuing firms 29 years of age or older.105
In our models analyzing the growth of small businesses, we include controls for 
both the size and age of the firm. Both variables, and their interactions, have been shown 
to be strongly correlated with business performance.  For example, Davis et al. (1996) 
find smaller businesses show higher gross job creation rates, while larger employers have 
103 Extensive discussion of the self-employed is out of scope for this monograph.  Also, many self-
employed do not migrate to being employers (Davis et al., 2009).
104 The study also finds that the self-employed are at the peak of their ability to create jobs at age 50 and the 
self-employed in manufacturing and construction sectors are more likely to create jobs than those in 
personal services.
105 Similar findings are reported by Haltiwanger, et al. (2009), National Research Council of the National 
Academies (2007), and Bartelsmann et al. (2005).
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higher net job creation rates.106 Similarly, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1999) show that 
young establishments exhibit high average net employment growth rates and high 
volatility of growth rates relative to large, mature establishments.  They also find that 
among young establishments, net employment growth rates do not exhibit any systematic 
patterns by size while among mature establishments, net employment growth increases 
with size.  Also, Luque (2002) finds that small, young plants are more likely to adopt new 
technologies relative to small, old plants.  More recently, Haltiwanger et al. (2009) used
the Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics, based on the 1976-2005 Longitudinal 
Business Database, and found no systematic relationship between firm size and growth 
after controlling for firm age. That is, there was no evidence of an inverse relationship 
between growth and size.  
They also report evidence of an “up or out” pattern among new businesses where 
up to 40 percent of new firms disappear but those that do not grow rapidly.  They argue 
that these are indications of learning effects in new businesses.  Similar patterns have 
been found in other studies. For example, several studies (Bartelsman and Doms 2000; 
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 2002) have found that less productive and less profitable 
businesses tend to exit, while more productive, more profitable businesses are more likely 
to survive and expand.  Such productivity (and presumably profitability) differences may 
be correlated with businesses’ likelihood of offering health insurance.  That is, better 
performing establishments may be more likely to offer insurance and doing so may make 
them even more productive if it makes their employees more motivated or healthier.
106 Some publications interpret data to show small businesses create more jobs.  See Davis et al. (1996) for 
a discussion of the statistical concerns with some of these estimates. 
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Concerns about such endogeneity motivates our use of an instrumental variables model in 
the following section.
If, because of tax differences, offering insurance is less expensive than offering
equivalent wage increases, it could be a way for small businesses to compete for workers.  
However, as discussed earlier, small firms tend to have lower wages than large firms
which may make it more difficult for them to compete for top quality workers in the labor 
market. If small firms can only hire lower quality workers, it could negatively affect their 
productivity and lower their probability of growth and survival (Brown and Medoff 
1989).
Finally, we note that as the size and age of a business increases, its chances of 
survival increase.  Newly created jobs have been shown to be more likely to survive or 
persist at larger employers and establishments belonging to multi-unit firms (Davis et al. 
1996) while plant failure rates and growth rates for surviving businesses decline with size
and age (Dunne et al. 1989).  As an illustration we offer Perline et al. (2006) results on 
establishments surviving from 1998 to 2003.  They provide the following partial 
distribution of survival rates over the 5-year period:  1-person: 61.4 percent; 2-3
employees: 70.1 percent; 4-7 employees: 75.3 percent; 512-1,023 employees: 84.2 
percent.
4.4  Concluding Remarks
The growth and survival of a small business may be affected by a multitude of 
factors, both macro and micro. While job creation declines during recessionary periods 
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such as our study period, there is also substantial evidence that age and size are strongly 
correlated with business performance.  We attempt to control or account for many of 
these factors in our empirical work.  
We also note that between 2001 and 2005 health insurance costs grew 
substantially.  By definition small businesses also constitute small individual insurance 
risk pools.  A single sick employee can influence the premiums faced by the entire firm 
while large employers’ rates would be affected much less.  Given the continued aging of 
the U.S. workforce, this may further reduce small businesses ability to offer their 
employees insurance they could realistically afford.107
107 It is beyond the scope of this manuscript to analyze how ACA will change the ability and probability of 
small businesses to offer health insurance to their employees.
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5. Data
As mentioned in the introduction, in this project we plan to link two unique 
datasets not publicly available: the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC).  These linked data 
allow us to move beyond the limitations faced by others in studying the effect of health 
insurance offering on small businesses.
5.1 The Longitudinal Business Database
The LBD covers virtually all non-farm private sector establishments and firms 
with employees.  It is composed of annual files for the years 1975 through 2005 that are 
linked together by an establishment identifier.108 To improve the linkages and reduce 
spurious plant births and deaths, Jarmin and Miranda (2002) supplemented the 
longitudinal numeric identifiers assigned by the Census Bureau with name and address 
matching to repair broken linkages.  Each annual file has information on about 7.5 
million establishments, making a total of over 232 million observations.
The LBD’s data items come from the Business Register, which gets information 
from administrative record sources including the Internal Revenue Service and the Social 
Security Administration.  For our purposes, the LBD’s key data items include
employment, payroll, location, industrial activity and firm affiliation.  In particular, we 
use the longitudinal nature of the LBD to calculate our dependent variables (i.e., growth 
108 An establishment refers to the physical location where business activity takes place.  A firm is 
comprised of one or more establishments under common ownership.
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measures and business survival).  While the LBD is useful as a stand-alone research 
dataset, it can be used in conjunction with other Census Bureau establishment and firm 
level micro data. The LBD contains a key numeric identifier that allows it to be linked to 
all the Census Bureau’s censuses and surveys over time, including the MEPS-IC. 
The firm identifiers combined with the LBD’s coverage of all non-agricultural 
sectors of the economy allows researchers to construct firm-level data by aggregating the 
information on all the firms’ individual establishments under the firm-level identifier.  
That means we can calculate the firms’ number of establishments or age, allowing us to 
construct firm as well as establishment level variables.  It is easy to imagine that, for 
instance, two restaurants with otherwise similar characteristics may behave differently if 
one is independent while the other is part of a large multiunit (MU) firm.  Table 5.1
illustrates the layout of the LBD data.109
The table shows several important characteristics of the LBD.  First, as mentioned 
above, there are both establishment and firm identification variables that allows us to 
construct firms from the establishment-level data.  For example, in 2000 firm number 
10001 has 3 separate establishments making it a multi-unit firm.  Note also that in 2001 it 
has added a fourth establishment.  By contrast, in the year 2000 there are two single unit 
establishments (Firm IDs 10002 and 10003).  In the next year firm number 10002 has 
ceased operations but another small single-unit firm, number 10004 has entered the 
market.  A second property of the LBD illustrated by Table 5.1 is the ability to calculate 
employment changes for both establishments and firms.  In the year 2000 firm number 
109 All the figures and identifiers presented in tables illustrating the LBD are fictional. However, they 
illustrate important aspects and attributes of the LBD.
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10001’s establishment number 0001 had 15 employees but by 2001 it had added two 
people for a total employment of 17.
While firm affiliation is an important factor when considering an establishment’s 
size, it is also important when considering its likelihood of growth and survival.  For 
example, while most research has shown that young establishments are more likely to
shrink or fail than are older ones, it is unlikely that a brand-new national chain restaurant,
with completely updated technology, is at a disadvantage when compared to the 20 year 
old diner it is located next door to.  
To further illustrate the types of results that can be obtained from the LBD, Table 
5.2 shows net job growth rates and firm and employment shares for firms by size class.  
Several interesting, previously documented, patterns emerge.  First note that there are far 
more small firms than large firms in the economy yet they account for a far smaller share 
of employment.  Next, it is clear that the net employment and growth rates in the number 
of firms differ by size category.  Employment growth is highest among small firms for 
the 2000-2005 period (likely because of the recession in the midst of the period).  Large 
firms lost employees on net during the 5 year timeframe.  On the other hand, the number 
of large firms increased by 14 percent compared to only 4 percent for small firms.  
Finally, note that Table 6 is performed at the firm level.  It is also possible (in fact more 
traditional) to perform the same exercise at the establishment level and also by other 
categories such as age, multi-unit/single-unit, and insurance offerings.
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5.2 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey – Insurance Component 
The MEPS-IC has been collected since 1996.  Each year of the MEPS-IC samples 
a representative cross-section of establishments across size and industry classes and 
provides cross-sectional information on health insurance premium costs and a 
longitudinal measure of whether establishments discontinued their health insurance 
offering during the last five years.  The MEPS-IC is an annual survey sponsored by the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
This survey permits national and state-level estimates and provides data on health plan 
information, establishment characteristics, and workforce characteristics.
All establishments in the MEPS-IC sample are asked whether or not they offer 
health insurance.  Data is also provided on worker out-of-pocket costs for employee 
contributions, deductibles, co-payments, and coinsurance.  If an employer does not offer 
insurance benefits, data is collected on a reduced number of items describing their 
establishment and workforce characteristics.  If the employer does make health insurance 
benefits available, the MEPS-IC provides information on up to four health plans offered 
by the establishment.  Data is contained on premium costs for single and family coverage, 
enrollment, and type of provider arrangement (i.e., exclusive, any, or mixture of 
providers).  For example, Table 5.3 shows the change from 1996 to 2004 in premium 
costs faced by establishments of different sizes.  The smallest businesses have both 
higher premium costs as well as bigger cost increases.  
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The sample for the MEPS-IC is drawn from the Business Register and can be linked 
using establishment identifiers to the LBD, which (as mentioned above) is also 
constructed from the Business Register.
5.3 Analytical Dataset
We focus on the 2001-2005 period since the 1990s were a period of considerable 
federal and state reforms such as guaranteed coverage and rate restrictions (GAO, 2000; 
Glover et al., 2000) introduced to increase health insurance availability.  In addition, 
2005 was the last year where LBD data was available at the time our analysis was 
conducted.
To construct our analytical dataset, we first linked 2001 MEPS-IC establishments to 
the 2001 LBD using the numeric establishment identifier contained in both files.  We 
successfully linked 27,595 establishments out of the 29,107 contained in the 2001 MEPS.  
We then keep firms with more than 1 employee to ensure no self-employed firms are 
included in the sample resulting in an analytical dataset of 24,545 MEPS 2001
establishments. In our growth regressions, we use “continuers”; that is, establishments 
that we can observe in both 2001 and 2005 (a total of 19,695 establishments).  In our 
survival analysis, our sample consists of 2001 MEPS establishments that are then 
“followed” through time and can be observed up to 2005.  Some of these establishments 
survive the entire 4-year period while others do not.
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5.4 Concluding Remarks:
We link two unique micro datasets not publicly available: the LBD and the 
MEPS-IC.  The LBD is a longitudinal dataset providing us with business growth 
measures and survival while the MEPS-IC provides detailed information on insurance 
coverage, premium costs and workforce characteristics.  These linked data allow us to 
move beyond the limitations faced by others in studying the effect of offering health 
insurance on small businesses.
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6. Methodology
The next two sections cover our empirical methodology in estimating the effects 
of health insurance offering on the performance of small businesses.  This first part 
details our methodology, and the second our models. Our main obstacle is the previously 
mentioned endogeneity between offering insurance and performance.  The issue is 
somewhat complicated by the dichotomous nature of health insurance offering.
6.1 Endogeneity
Our primary research question, “How does offering health insurance affect the 
performance of small firms?” is plagued with endogeneity issues, and therefore, it is 
crucial we exercise care to avoid confusing observed correlated outcomes.  It may be that 
only successful firms offer insurance (perhaps as part of an efficiency wage) and/or it 
may also be that offering insurance affects firm performance perhaps for the better - via 
employee health and moral - or for the worse - because of the high costs of providing it.  
When we observe a poor performer not offering health insurance at a given point in time,
is it the case that the slow or negative growth led the firm to stop offering health 
insurance? Or is the fact that the firm did not offer health insurance one of the factors that 
led to the poor performance of the firm?  
Thus, the question at hand is a good candidate for a treatment effects model.  
Such models measure the impact of a change or “treatment” on agents such as people or 
businesses.  The ideal way to measure those effects is to observe the subject at a single 
point in time as both treated and untreated - but of course this is impossible to do.  We do 
not have information on the subjects’ state both with and without treatment.  Given that, 
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one way to interpret the experiment is as a problem of missing data.   Researchers such as 
Heckman (1992, 1997) have done just that and developed several methodologies to proxy 
for the missing information.  Wooldridge (2002, 2009) provides an excellent overview of 
some of the more popular methodologies and we rely heavily on his work for the 
following discussion.
According to Wooldridge (2002),110 treatment effects models often focus on 
measuring either the “Average Treatment Effect” (ATE)  or the “Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated” (ATE1).  The ATE is the expected outcome of the treatment on a 
randomly drawn person from the population while the ATE1 is the mean effect for those 
who actually participated in the program.  We follow Wooldridge’s notation and define 
the outcomes of the untreated and treated groups as y0 and y1 respectively, x as a vector 
of covariates, and w as a binary treatment indicator where w = 1 is the treated and w = 0 
is the untreated group.  Then we can write the ATE as:
ATE = E(y1 - y0)
And the observed outcomes can be written as:
(1) y = (1-w) y0 + w y1 = y0 + w(y1 - y0)
If the treatment is randomized across the population, the ATE could be measured by 
simply subtracting the mean of the untreated from the mean of the treated group but 
treatment is rarely randomized.  In fact, there is almost always self-selection into 
treatment so researchers must get around the problem by making an assumption to help 
identify the effects of interest. One of the most common assumptions, “ignorability of 
treatment” was introduced by Rossenbaum and Rubin (1983). They defined it as: 
110 Just Wooldridge from this point on.
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Conditional on x:
w and (y0, y1) are independent.
Or, in a weaker, conditional mean independence form:
(A)E(y0|x, w) = E(y0|x)
and
(B) E(y1|x, w) = E(y1|x)
Wooldridge’s intuitive explanation for the ignorability of treatment is: “…if we can 
observe enough information (contained in x) that determines treatment, then (y0, y1)
might be mean independent of w, conditional on x.  Loosely, even though (y0, y1) and w
might be correlated, they are uncorrelated once we partial out x.”111
Most parametric approaches to the problem begin by separating the two types of 
outcomes into separate decompositions of mean and random effects.  That is:
y0 = μ0 + ?0, ???0) = 0
y1 = μ1 + ?1, ???1) = 0
When we plug these expressions into equation (1) then we get:
(2) y = μ0 + (μ1 - μ0)w ???0 + w??1 - ?0)
If the ignorability of treatment assumption is valid, then Wooldridge suggests two 
popular regression approaches from the literature.  The first he calls a “kitchen sink” or 
“saturated model” approach which is to add enough controls in x so that w and (y0, y1)
are “appropriately unrelated”.  That is, use x to proxy for the unobservables correlated 
with w that affect (y0, y1).  He also notes that even when measuring ATE, it is important 
to exclude classes of agents that would never realistically be expected to participate in 
111 Wooldridge (2002) p. 607.
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treatment.  That is, millionaires would  never realistically participate in a program to 
retrain unemployed persons as bookkeepers.
The second approach is the propensity score method based on Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983).  The propensity score method models the probability of treatment given 
the covariates.  That is, p(x) = P(w =1 | x) where p(x) is the response probability for 
treatment.  As with the kitchen sink approach it is important to exclude the units that have 
very little chance of receiving treatment when calculating the propensity score.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest using a flexible logit model featuring a robust set 
of covariates, interactions, and quadratics to estimate the propensity score.  Once 
calculated, the propensity score is often included as a regressor in a separate model where 
it serves as a summary control function for the nonrandom selection effects.  
This approach shares many similarities to the kitchen sink model and Wooldridge 
points out that if you estimate the propensity score with a linear probability model instead 
of a logit, the results are identical to those obtained with the saturated model.  On the 
other hand, the two approaches are different in the assumptions they require for 
consistency so that neither clearly dominates the other – although Wooldridge does 
express a preference for the linearity assumption of the standard regression model by the 
end of his discussion.
Both the kitchen sink model and the propensity score approach depend on the 
ignorability of treatment assumption.  If that assumption is violated, as in our case, then 
neither method is appropriate.  Because of the endogeneity between health insurance 
offering and business performance, we cannot simply condition on a set of covariates to
make the treatment (offering health insurance) and outcome variables (growth, survival) 
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independent of one-another.  This problem also precludes us from using a difference-in-
difference approach.
Instead we adopt an instrumental variables approach that is slightly different from 
the conventional case because of our binary endogenous regressor.  Following 
Wooldridge???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????0 and 
?1 are mean independent of w given x (assumptions (A) and (B) above).  According to 
Wooldridge, if we can assume that ATE=ATE1, then we can use standard IV techniques 
under “fairly week assumptions”.  Specifically, we need to assume:
(A) ?0 ???1
(B) ???0 | x??????????0 | x)
(C) P(w=1 | x, z) ^= P(w=1| x) and P(w=1 | x, z) = G(x,z; ?)
where G is a known parametric form, usually a probit or logit.
(D) ?????0 | x, z) = ?20
As mentioned above, condition (A) is met if ATE=ATE1.  In our case this seems 
reasonable if we can provide an adequate set of controls such as industry, firm age, etc..
Conditional on such controls, there is little reason to suspect that the effects of HIO will 
be different for the establishments offering it and the population of businesses in general.  
Assumption (B) holds if the instrument, z, is independent of (y0, x).  It also assumes that 
???0 | x, z) is linear and does not hold for non-linear models.  For this reason we will use 
a linear probability model rather than a probit or proportional hazard model for our 
survival analysis. Assumption (C) is fairly standard and says that z has predictive power 
in the linear projection on (x, z) and we test this assumption in our results section.  
Finally, assumption (D) implies that the variance is constant.
73
According to Wooldridge, given these four fairly weak assumptions, we can use 
the following “2-step” (really 3 steps) estimator, which he labels “Procedure 18.1”:
Step 1: Estimate the binary response model P(w = 1 | x, z?????????????????????
maximum likelihood (usually a probit) and obtain the fitted probabilities 
G-hat.
Step 2: Begin IV/ 2SLS estimation using the fitted probabilities from the first step 
in the first stage of the 2SLS regression.
Wooldridge stresses that this is NOT the same as using the fitted probabilities in (a) as 
the first stage of 2SLS.  However, when properly done, the estimator has several 
advantages.  First, the usual 2SLS standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically 
valid.  Also, the estimator is asymptotically efficient in the class of estimators where the 
IVs are functions of (x,z).
Perhaps most importantly though, he notes that112 Procedure 18.1 has an 
important robustness property.  Because we are using Gi-hat as an instrument for wi, the 
model P(w = 1 | x, z) does not113 have to be correctly specified.  For example, if we 
specify a probit model for P(w = 1 | x, z), we do not need the probit model to be correct.  
Generally, what we need is that the linear projection of wi onto [x, G (x, z??????????????????
depends on G (x, z?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
estimator when the model is misspecified (see White 1982a).  These requirements are 
fairly weak when z is partially correlated with w.114 As he notes:
112 Wooldridge (2002) pages 623-24.
113 His emphasis
114 Our emphasis
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Technically, ? and ? are identified even if we do not have extra exogenous 
variables excluded from x.  But we can rarely justify the estimator in that 
case…115
Because of this, we have a great deal of latitude in our choice of instruments for HIO.  
We do not need to correctly specify our first probit model, all we need is for there to be 
partially correlation between our instrument and HIO for the IV procedure to work.  Or, 
in his words:116
In summary, using fitted probabilities from a first-stage binary response model, 
such as probit or logit, as an instrument for w is an nice way to exploit the binary 
nature of the endogenous explanatory variable.
6.2 Modeling
Following Wooldridge (2002), we use a “2SLS” approach comprised of 3 equations:
(3) P (offer) i =  G i ??????Z i ????1X1i + μ i
(4) P (offer) i =  G i ???????-hat1 i + ?2X2i ????i
(5) Y i ??????-hat2 i + ?3X2i + ? i
Where Z i is a vector of instruments and X1i is a set of control variables.  Equation (3) is 
estimated using a probit and its predicted probabilities, G-hat1i, are used as regressors in 
equation (4) - which is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  Finally, equation 
4’s predicted probabilities, G-hat2i, become the final estimated probabilities used in the 
equations of Y i - firm performance (5). 
As our literature review showed, developing a model, particularly an empirical 
model for Equation (3) – a businesses’ decisions to offer health insurance – is far from 
115 ? and ? are the model’s parameters.  Page 624.
116 Wooldridge (2002) page 625.
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trivial.  Some of the best work in this area has been done by Feldman, Dowd, Leitz, and 
Blewett (1997) and was subsequently modified by Nichols, Blumberg, Cooper, and 
Vistnes (2001).  Their methodologies start with the assumption that firms’ decisions to 
offer health insurance is based on their need to offer a cost-minimizing combination of 
wages and benefits that maintains employees’ utility at a high enough level to allow them 
to be competitive in the labor market.  The solution to the firm’s problem generates an 
inverse demand function for insurance and firms will offer insurance if the price is less 
than its reservation price for a relatively parsimonious wage/benefit package.  
Nichols et al. (2001) begins with the following description of workers’ demand for 
health insurance where worker demand for health insurance is HIdw , WP is the net 
(relative) price of health insurance to the worker, B is the benefits and cost sharing 
package offered by the firm, s is the employer’s share of the premium P, T? is the sum of 
????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reduction in wages the worker must accept to get the employer to offer the insurance.
(6) HIdw =  f(WP, V(B)),
where
(7) WP  = (1-s)P  +  (1-T????
They go on to note that according to (Pauly 1998), economists have not developed a 
well-accepted theory of how firms aggregate worker preferences and their willingness to 
forego wages into firms’ health insurance purchase decisions.  Nevertheless, Nichols et 
al. (2001) offer the following “reasonable” demand/probability of offer equation:
(8) ?????????????????????dw, SIZE, COMPETITION)
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where FP is the firm’s price of health insurance, SIZE equals firm size, and 
COMPETITION refers to pressures faced by the firm to offer health insurance in order to 
remain competitive in the market for workers.  This variable could be proxied by 
anything from labor market tightness to workers’ mobility to transfer among firms 
(because of unionization).
The firm’s price of health insurance is a function of both administrative costs and 
how much they can offset it with wage cuts.  Wage flexibility is related to the degree of 
the proposed wage cut (the premium) and also on the workers’ willingness to accept 
wage reductions at all.  They point out the wage distribution as a particularly important 
determinant of wage flexibility since higher wage workers face a higher marginal tax rate 
and also because health insurance is a normal good, V(B) is higher for higher wage 
workers.  Finally, worker willingness to pay reduced wages for health insurance is also 
determined by demographic factors that affect health insurance use – and need.
Firm size is included because insurance rates are lower for large firms because of 
lower administrative costs and a bigger pool of workers to spread risk over for insurers.  
Nichols and Garrett (1999) make the important point that because total insurance 
premiums for workers at small firms are more than those at large firms, small firms 
operating in the same labor market as large firms must either bear part of the cost of 
providing health insurance themselves or provide workers with additional compensating 
differentials to remain competitive in the market for workers.
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6.3 Selectivity and Final Algorithm
We need information on the price of health insurance for all firms in order to estimate 
equation (8) but we can observe it only for those firms that actually make the offer.  If we 
were to include only data on firms offering insurance our estimates would be biased 
(Kennedy (2008)) so we follow Feldman et al. (1997) and Nichols et al. (2001) and use a 
five step process to estimate a firm’s probability of offering health insurance where steps 
1-3 are essentially Heckman’s correction for selection bias.  In our case we also include 
our instruments (discussed below) in step (5) in order to begin the 3-step “2SLS” 
estimation technique outlined by Wooldridge.  Therefore our entire empirical procedure, 
incorporating corrections for selectivity on insurance prices and endogeneity between 
measures of firm performance and HIO can be summarized as:
(1) Estimate a reduced form probability of offer equation which does not include 
premiums as explanatory variables since they are not observable for the firms that 
do not offer insurance.
(2) Calculate self-selection terms for offering and non-offering firms
(3) Estimate a premium or supply price equation for the offering firms using the self-
selection term as an explanatory variable
(4) Predict premiums for all firms using the ratio of the selection terms and the results 
from (3)
(5) Estimate a probit equation of the probability of offering health insurance for all 
firms using the predicted premiums and state dummies as instruments as well as 
control variables (described below).
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(6) Use the predicted values for HIO probabilities as the next stage in our “2SLS” 
estimation: an OLS regression of HIO probability on our control variables from 
(7) below. 
(7) OLS regression of firm performance on control variables and predicted HIO from 
(6).
We use Stata 2SLS estimation to estimate steps (6) and (7) above in order to obtain 
correct standard errors.
6.4 Empirical Implementation
Our first four steps follow Nichols et al. (2001) but we diverge from them for the 
remaining steps.  We begin by specifying the reduced form offer equation as:
(9) ???????????????X??????
where E(e)=0, and X is a vector of both supply and demand-side variables including: 
State-specific dummies to control for state-specific benefit mandate and regulatory 
heterogeneity, as well as economic and health infrastructure differences; establishment 
size variables to capture underwriting effects related to insurance group size and the 
economic performance of the location; firm size dummies to proxy for economic 
performance and overall insurance pool size; multi-unit dummy; a measure of the percent 
of the workforce that is union as a proxy for the collective bargaining power of the 
workforce, and possibly labor mobility; firm age; industry; legal form of organization of 
the business; worker demographics (shares of full-time, female, and older workers) which 
are associated with workers’ demand for health care and insurance and therefore both 
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their willingness to trade wages for health insurance and the characteristics of the benefits 
package; dummies for whether or not the percent of low wage (below $6.50/hr.) is above 
or below half, less than ten, or somewhere in-between; measures of county-level 
economic factors that could affect labor market conditions including: the lagged 
unemployment rate, the share of manufacturing firms, and the share of employment 
accounted for by big firms.
The results from the probit are used to calculate self-selection terms which are 
included in the premium equation:
(10) ln(premium)p =  Sps?????? p???- ??o ????p
The unit of observation for (10) is health insurance plans and Sps is the subset of supply-
side controls from equation (9).  It includes everything except for firm size and 
unionization which are assumed to affect only the demand side.  Qp is the benefits 
package supplied by the firm and it includes information on factors that affect the 
premium such as whether or not the plan is self-insured, whether the establishment is part 
of a multi-employer purchasing arrangement, whether the plan is an HMO, PPO, etc., the 
deductible, prenatal and maternity care, prescription benefits etc. 117 ??????????o is the 
selection correction term for offering firms.  
Once the equation is estimated, we calculate a dollar premium that can be used as 
one of the instruments in step (5), the first stage in our 3-step estimation. We also 
include the state-specific effects in this first stage but not in the remaining two equations.  
Both should be correlated with HIO.  Premium prices are a key determinant of the 
offering decision and we now have estimated  premiums for all (both offering and non-
117 See Nichols et al. (2001) for a complete description of the variables included.
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offering) establishments.  And, as Nichols et al. (2001) note, state regulatory, 
infrastructure, and economic environments affect HIO decisions.  Furthermore, neither is 
likely to be correlated with the error term.
Explicitly, our covariates for the probit equation in step (5) include our predicted 
premium and state dummies as instruments as well as a variety of control variables;
namely, firm size, a multi-establishment firm indicator, union indicator, firm age, 
industry dummies, legal form of organization of the business; worker demographics 
(shares of full-time, female, and older workers); dummies for whether or not the percent 
of low wage is above or below half, less than ten, or somewhere in-between; measures of 
county-level economic factors that could affect local labor market conditions including: 
the lagged unemployment rate, the share of manufacturing firms, and the share of 
employment accounted for by big firms.
6.5 Specifications
In our final step, we use several metrics118 for our dependent variable Y: growth 
in employment, growth in payroll, growth in average wage, and survival.119 Following 
Wooldridge, our X2i vector includes the control variables in step (5) above,120 (see Table 
6.1 for variables means) and in addition, we include MSA-level employment growth as a 
measure of local economic conditions.
118 Payroll is deflated.  Revenue or profits would have been a better measure of business performance. 
Unfortunately, the LBD does not have this type of data.
119 Our analysis is conducted at the establishment level.  Size and age are firm-level variables.
120 These variables have also proven effective in predicting establishment outcomes (such as multi/single 
establishment status, firm age and sector). See, for example, Dunne Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), Davis, 
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1995), and Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Krizan (2010). 
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We conduct separate estimations for small and large firms independently to better 
assess the potential effects of health insurance offering on small compared to large
firms.121 We define small firms as those having 50 or less employees. We chose this 
cutoff point for a variety of reasons:  i) Although each state has their own set of 
regulations that determine what size of business falls into the classification of "small 
business," making them eligible for small group health insurance, the common size for a 
small group classification is between 2 and 50 employees; ii) it is the threshold used in 
2010 ACA to define small businesses that are exempt from the bill’s shared responsibility 
requirement, and thus, not required to pay a penalty if not offering health insurance; iii)
it is often used in MEPS publications.122
Our growth in employment, payroll and average wage measures are calculated 
using Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh’s (1996) approach :
???Y = (Y2005 – Y2001) / (( Y2001 + Y2005)/2)
As they point out, this percentage change formula not only approximates log differences, 
it also has several advantages. Perhaps most importantly, it is bounded by -2 and 2.  This 
means that expansions and contractions are treated symmetrically.  By contrast, when the 
base year is used in the denominator, the resulting changes are bounded by -1 and 
infinity.123
The dependent variable of our survival analysis is a 1/0 indicator that takes the 
value of 1 if the establishment still exist in year t, and is 0 otherwise.  In the last two steps 
121 We also compute robust standard errors.
122 See for example MEPS Statistical Brief #207 (2008).
123 Although not applicable to our sample of continuers, this methodology can handle births and deaths 
while log differences cannot.
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of our analysis (where we use 2SLS) and following Wooldridge methodology, we 
employ a linear probability model since the 3-step estimation properties outlined by 
Wooldridge would not apply were we to run a non-linear model (e.g., probit) in our last 
stage.
Given extensive literature (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989), Davis 
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), Luque (2002), Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2010))
highlighting the importance of the interaction between size and age in  business 
outcomes, we explore this dimension in our analysis by conducting estimations by firm 
size and age.  That is, we produce four separate sets of results by firm size and age: 
small-young, small-old, large-young and large-old.  We consider a firm to be old if it has 
been in existence for more than 5 years as of 2001.
6.6 Measurement Improvement Considerations
An instrumental variables approach has an additional potential benefit in this 
context. The original HIO variable in our data is binary.  It does not allow for any 
gradations in response.  That is, firms must either offer or not offer – and insurance 
packages come in fairly lumpy bundles.  If a business wants to offer a little insurance, it
must either choose none or a full package at a given price and will choose zero if the 
price is not low enough to prompt the business to offer insurance.  In that case, our 
dichotomous variable mismeasures the firm’s choice by the amount of insurance it 
wanted to buy.  If it were to choose to purchase the larger package, the measurement 
error would be the difference between the desired package and that purchased.  
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Our  instrument, the estimated premium for all (both offering and non-offering) 
establishments, is a continuous variable estimated for all businesses, and as such offers a 
finer measure of health insurance offering than the 0-1 indicator. Just as an IV estimator 
can be used to eliminate measurement error by eliminating extraneous information (the
error term associated with the variable), in this case it may improve our estimates by 
providing more accurate information than the dichotomous variable.
6.7 Concluding Remarks:
According to Wooldridge, given four fairly weak assumptions, we can use a
robust “2-step” (really 3 steps) IV estimator to estimate the effect of HIO.  We need 
information on the price of health insurance for all firms in order to estimate our first step 
equation, but we have it only for those firms that actually make the offer.  Since including 
only data on firms offering insurance would bias our estimates, we follow Feldman et al. 
(1997) and Nichols et al. (2001) and use a five step process to estimate a firm’s 
probability of offering health insurance where steps 1-3 are essentially Heckman’s 
correction for selection bias. 
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7. Results
This section presents the results of our empirical analyses where we examine the 
effect of offering health insurance on business performance by firm size as well as firm 
size-age interactions.
7.1 Size Effects
We are primarily concerned with estimating the effects of health insurance 
offering on firm performance and examining whether that effect varies for small vs. large
firms.  We measure performance by growth in employment, payroll and average wages as 
well as survival, but are also interested in looking at how employment, payroll and 
average wages levels are affected by HIO and how that effect may vary by firm size.  
Table 7.1 displays our levels (in logs) results. Like much of the literature, we find a 
large, positive and highly significant relationship between employment, payroll and 
average wages, and health insurance offering, which seems to exist for establishments in 
both small and large firms. For example, offering establishments in small firms have 
almost 300% more employees than similar firms not offering insurance while 
establishments in large HIO firms have about 80% more people working in them than 
their large non-offering counterparts.
Our payroll and average wage results indicate that businesses – whether small or 
large - offering health insurance offer larger total compensation packages than do similar 
businesses that do not offer coverage to their workers.  Currie and Madrian (1999)
hypothesis that some firms seek to hire better qualified workers than other similar firms 
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and thus must pay a higher level of total compensation for them seems a plausible 
explanation for this finding.
Table 7.1 also displays uncorrected (no IV) OLS results.  These have the same 
sign and are lower in magnitude than our IV estimates.  Our expectation was that using 
IV to correct the endogeneity bias would reduce the size of the coefficients relative to 
OLS.  However, this is not the case.  Our coefficients are very large, both in absolute 
terms and relative to the OLS results.  Their magnitude does not seem reasonable.
This suggests that either our instruments are poor – which we test in a later 
section – and/or that the differences are due to the reduction of measurement error by the 
IV methodology. In models developed by Feldman, Dowd, Leitz, and Blewett (1997) 
and Nichols, Blumberg, Cooper, and Vistnes (2001), firms are assumed to offer insurance 
if the price of offering health insurance is less than their reservation price for a particular 
package of benefits.  As mentioned earlier, some firms may wish to purchase a less 
generous package than what is offered on the regulated markets and are instead observed
as purchasing zero insurance.  One of the main advantages of our instrument for HIO is 
that it includes the imputation of premiums for all (offering and non-offering) firms and 
is a continuous variable that reveals information about non-offering firms.
Next we turn our attention to the regressions with growth as the dependent 
variables and display the results in Table 7.2.124 Although the levels regressions showed 
strong positive correlations between employment, payroll and average wage and health 
insurance offering, the percentage change results show weaker correlations for both small 
and large firms. Nevertheless, the effects are substantial.  Employment and payroll at 
124 Recall also that 2005 is the last year that the LBD is currently available.
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establishments of small firms that offer insurance grow 12% and 8% faster on average 
respectively than do similar small businesses that do not. 
Although the coefficients for large firms tend to be larger in magnitude, they are 
less likely to be significant (our IV estimates indicate that only employment growth is 
statistically significantly impacted by HIO).  The relationship between HIO and growth 
in average wage does not seem to be statistically significant for either small or large 
firms.  This is the case because although offering health insurance seems to be positively 
correlated with growth in employment and payroll, the corresponding percentage increase 
in employment is (statistically significant and) larger in magnitude than the one in payroll 
(which is not significant for large firms).  
Taken together, these results indicate that small as well as large businesses 
offering insurance are bigger and pay higher wages than those that do not.  Also, their 
employment grows faster than that of other firms and for small firms, so does their 
payroll.  However, although they have higher levels of compensation and employment, 
their rate of average wage growth is not significantly different from non-offering 
businesses. Nevertheless, their employees are still paid better (particularly considering 
they also have health insurance, and thus, a higher compensation package) relative to 
other firms and the absolute difference will grow over time as long as the rates of change 
are indistinguishable.  Offering relatively better overall compensation than other firms 
would make offering firms more appealing to workers than their competitors who offer 
lower wages and benefits.  
Of course these businesses would expect a return on their investment in their 
workers, and thus, we would expect to see it reflected in their profits.  Unfortunately, we 
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cannot observe profits (or revenue) in our data and cannot directly measure them.
Nevertheless, in our results we have seen signs of better performance in the form of 
higher employment growth, and also payroll for small firms. As noted by Currie and 
Madrian (1999), the literature suggests we might expect to see insurance-offering firms 
growing faster than non-offering businesses because people may hesitate to leave a job 
offering insurance if they are uncertain they can obtain it when they find a new position
(“job lock”).  We usually think of job changes as occurring when the value of a new job 
is higher than the value of the existing one, but if changing jobs means changing, or 
possibly losing, health insurance, then the individual will factor this into their decision as 
well.  This may be particularly applicable to sick employees who may fear that they will 
become uninsurable should they try to change jobs.  This is not an unreasonable fear 
given that small employers’ premiums can be very sensitive to the wellness of their labor 
pool.125
Job lock could impact the net job creation rates of groups of businesses.  Assume 
there are two groups of businesses, one with job lock and another without it.  Assume 
also that all the businesses in both groups have reached a stable employment equilibrium 
that they do not wish to change.  That is, they want to keep employment at current levels.  
If employees in both groups experience random shocks prompting them to change jobs 
randomly, the firms they leave would temporarily be below their equilibrium 
employment levels until they can hire replacements.  However, if some employees 
experience job lock and are more resistant to these shocks, then the firms offering 
insurance could be expected to lose fewer workers and have higher employment levels
125 It is beyond the scope of this manuscript to assess how new regulations regarding employer offered 
health insurance under ACA will impact these findings.
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and higher (less negative) growth rates. We could perform the same logic to firms that 
want to shrink or grow so that, overall, we would expect groups of firms that have a 
tighter lock on their employees would grow faster than those that do not.
We turn next to examining the effects of health insurance offers on a different 
performance measure, survival rates (Table 7.2). Our results indicate that offering health 
insurance is correlated with about a 10% greater four-year survival rate for 
establishments in small firms and about a 58% increase for those in large firms.  These
coefficients are highly significant, suggesting that offering insurance is an important 
factor contributing to firm survival for establishments in both large and small firms.
Since firm age has long been shown to be a major factor in performance and survival, 
offering health insurance seems to be highly correlated to whether or not the 
establishment survives.  Together with our earlier findings on wage levels and 
employment growth, we believe that this provides evidence consistent with the theory 
that firms offering insurance (and higher wages) are hiring better performing workers 
which is positively affecting firm performance.
7.2 Size–Age Effects
The importance of firm size and age is well documented in the literature (Dunne, 
Roberts and Samuelson (1989), Davis Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), Luque (2002),
etc.).  Recent work by Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2010) sheds additional light on 
the interaction of these two important factors in business growth.  They find that the 
commonly held belief that growth is inversely related to size (that is, small businesses 
account for most of net job creation) largely disappears once one properly adjusts for 
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regression to the mean biases and once firm age is controlled for it may even reverse 
itself.  
These patterns are particularly important at start-ups.  Haltiwanger et al. (2010)
find evidence of an “up or out” pattern among start-up businesses where up to 40 percent 
of new firms disappear shortly after their creation but that those that survive grow 
rapidly.  They argue that these results help highlight the connection between business 
formation, experimentation, and learning.126 They also point-out that large businesses are 
important players in overall employment growth, noting that they account for 45 percent 
of total job creation. 
Although all of our results control for age, given the importance of the size and 
age interaction, we re-ran our earlier regressions by both categories and obtained some 
interesting patterns (Table 7.3).  The level effects for small firms are nearly identical to 
the original small-firm results from Table 7.1.  Age does not seem to change the earlier 
results for small firms.  That is, small firms, whether young or old,  tend to have larger 
establishments and offer higher wages than small businesses that do not offer health 
insurance.  Large firms, however, seem to differ according to their age when it comes to 
average wages. It appears that older large firms are primarily responsible for the positive 
correlation between offering health insurance and average wage levels.
In the results for growth in employment, payroll and wages, the age effect seems 
to dominate the size effect (Table 7.4).  That is, older firms (both small and large) 
offering health insurance have higher growth rates in payroll and employment. We do 
not observe a statistically significant relationship between health insurance offering and 
126 See Foster Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006) for evidence of selection and learning effects in young 
businesses.
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employment or payroll growth among young firms (regardless of size). As before, there 
does not seem to be a statistically significant relation between offering health insurance 
and growth in average wages.  Finally, survival is positively and significantly correlated 
with offering insurance for all but young large firms.  
These results substantiate many of our previous findings.  In particular, they point 
to a consistent pattern where health insurance offering firms (whether small or large) tend 
to offer higher total compensation packages to their employees and are also more likely 
to survive – indicating that they are already more productive and/or that they get a 
productivity boost out of offering insurance to their employees (the exception is young 
large businesses).  Regarding the relationship between health insurance offering and 
business growth, our main finding from our age-size categorization is that only older 
businesses (whether small or large) show a statistically significant correlation between 
offering insurance and changes in employment and payroll. 
This could be in-part because of the selection and learning effects noted by 
studies such as those done by Haltiwanger et al. (2010).  That is, all young businesses go 
through a selection and learning effect and, assuming they survive, experience substantial 
productivity gains as they age (Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006)).  Since our
percentage change results condition on survival,127 when we select establishments owned 
by young firms, we are selecting businesses whose productivity is growing.   Such 
establishments would also be expected to grow faster, so it is not surprising that we are 
unable to discern an additional effect from offering health insurance when we focus on 
their establishments.  The normal gains from selection and learning may be 
127 That is, our businesses are all continuers.
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indistinguishable from any additional benefit of offering insurance.  By contrast, we 
observe large positive effects for older firms of both sizes which have presumably 
already had enough time to mature so that the selection and learning effects are less 
substantial.
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Although Wooldridge’s methodology is less sensitive to the choice of 
instruments, we test the robustness of our results by re-running some of the models using 
alternative instruments. Our alternative instrument sets include: (i) county-level 
Medicare costs and state dummies, (ii) the percent of firms in the county that have 1000 
or more employees nationwide, the county’s share of employment from firms with 100 or 
more employees, the county’s percent of manufacturing employment (this set is hereafter 
referred to as “county-level controls”) and county Medicare costs, (iii) county-level 
controls and state dummies, (iv) county-level controls.
The results in Table 7.5 indicate that our initial results are quite similar to those 
obtained with the alternative specifications.  The signs, magnitudes, and significance
levels of the coefficients from the alternatives are quite similar to our baseline model 
which used the estimated premiums and state dummies as instruments.  The patterns of 
our findings are robust to a wide range of instruments.
7.4 Instrument Tests
Our use of IV estimation is predicted on the belief that growth in employment and 
payroll (and firm performance in general) is correlated with HIO. To test this assumption, 
92
we performed Wu-Hausman tests of the endogeneity of health insurance with payroll and 
employment.  As expected, we found strong evidence that both variables are endogenous 
in our models.
The biggest difficulty in running an instrumental variables model is finding a valid 
instrument.  While Wooldridge’s methodology allows for a great deal of leeway in the 
specification of our initial probit (see the Methodology section for details), this is still the 
most difficult part of  successfully using IV. A standard test of the strength of the 
instruments is an F-test of their joint significance.  We report the results of both F-tests of 
the joint significance of the instruments as well as the probability value (p-value) of the 
null that one of the instruments is in fact endogenous.  Table 7.6 shows the results.  
The F values for small firms are close to 10 for our baseline model as well as for the 
Medicare costs/state and county-level instruments, indicating a strong correlation 
between the instruments and the endogenous variable.  However, the F values for large 
firms are generally hovering around 2.  This may indicate that our instruments are weaker
for large firms.  Our concern about this is tempered by the fact that our primary focus is 
on estimating the  effects of HIO on small business performance.
Finally we tried to perform Sargan overidentification tests of the instruments.  The 
intuition of the Sargan test is that when you estimate an equation using IV, the 
instruments should not be correlated with the errors for two reasons.  First, they are not 
supposed to be explanatory variables in the original relationship and secondly, valid 
instruments are not supposed to be correlated with the errors.  The test tests the dual null 
hypotheses that the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors and that they did not 
belong in the estimation equation as explanatory variables themselves.  
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Usually the test is performed following 2SLS where the errors in stage 2 are regressed 
on the instruments.  However, our methodology is more complex and this complicates 
standard test methodologies and their interpretation in a variety of ways. First, our 
instruments reside in the first stage and the second stage contains the estimated 
probabilities.  Given this, it was not entirely clear which instruments and which error 
term should be used and we were unable to find clear direction in the literature.  We ran 
the test at the end of a traditional 2SLS estimation with our core instruments, not the 
predicted probabilities, in the first stage.  
Second, our next hurdle was that Stata does not allow the computation of the Sargan 
test with weighted data, noting that the appropriateness of the critical values is unclear.128
We were able however to force the test to be run, but note that given the methodological 
uncertainties regarding the tests, the test results should be interpreted with caution.  The 
usually accepted benchmark p-value is 0.10. While many of our instruments perform 
above this threshold in a large share of the specifications, no one set of instruments 
achieves it throughout all of them.  They mainly fall below 0.10 for the large firm
specifications.
Third, recall that we are using a large number of instruments in most cases, and test of 
overidentification are known to be very sensitive to the number of instruments (Bekker 
(1994), Lee and Okui (2009), Chao, Hausman, Newey, Swanson, and Woutersen (2010)).
Thus, the p-values may be unreliable when a large number of instruments are being 
tested.  With this in mind, we ran a second set of overidentification tests using only states 
dummies as instruments and found that even these p-values were below 0.10 in several 
128See http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?ivregress+postestimation#estatoverid and 
http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2010-12/msg01018.html for details.
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specifications.  We note also that when we use the fewest number of instruments (in the 
county-level instrument set) we achieve the highest p-values.  It seems likely then that in 
some cases our low p-values are due to using a large number of instruments and not to an
endogeneity problem.  
Overall, given the uncertainty of standard testing methodologies as applied to our 3-
step IV approach, the potential inappropriateness of the critical values, and the sensitivity 
of the procedure to large numbers of instruments, we interpret the test results with 
caution.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
We have reservations about the reasonableness of the magnitude of some of our 
coefficients, particularly as they compare to our OLS benchmarking.  However, the 
patterns within our results indicate that businesses offering health insurance, particularly 
small businesses, offer larger total compensation packages than do similar businesses that 
do not offer insurance. These businesses also grow faster and survive longer.  Again, the 
evidence was stronger for small firms.
When we break the results out by age and size, young businesses (both large and 
small) that offer health insurance grow at not significantly different rates as those that do 
not, possibly due to selection effects.129 However, older businesses (whether small or 
large) offering health insurance seem to have higher establishment employment and 
payroll growth.  Finally, survival was strongly, positively correlated with HIO for older 
establishments at both large and small firms (with the exception of young large firms).
129 All results control for age and size.  In some cases we use dummy variables, in other we run the models 
by age categories.
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These results suggest that young small businesses offering health insurance seem 
to be more likely to survive, and once they have been in business for a while, offering 
health insurance seems to increase their chances of success (as measured by employment 
and payroll growth).
We tested the robustness of these findings to a variety of instruments and found 
that the patterns hold across all our instrument sets.  When we tested the strength and 
endogeneity of our instruments (and the alternatives) the results were weak for large 
firms in particular.  However, we also note a number of concerns about the 
appropriateness of the testing methodology in our context.  Still, while our findings for 
large firms mirror those obtained for small firms, the results from the instrument tests, as 
well as the magnitudes of our coefficients in general, suggest that the results should be 
interpreted cautiously.
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8. Conclusions
Rising health care costs, risk factors, and administrative costs can make ESI 
prohibitively expensive for small employers.  While not all employees want insurance, 
particularly if it meant accepting a reduction in wages, many do.  Firms unable to offer it 
could be at a disadvantage when competing for qualified workers and may have to adjust 
their other benefit offerings or change their labor demand, for instance by relying more 
heavily on part-time workers, investing in additional capital or scaling-back their 
production goals.
The focus of our work is on how offering insurance affects the growth and 
survival of small businesses.  Small business performance can be affected by a multitude 
of factors and we attempt to control for as many as possible, both macro and micro. An 
additional complication is the endogenous nature firm growth and health insurance 
offering.
Because of the bivariate nature of our endogenous variable we are not able to use 
conventional instrumental variables techniques.  Instead we rely on a technique 
developed by Wooldridge (2002).  According to Wooldridge, given four fairly weak 
assumptions, we can use a robust 3-step IV estimator to estimate the effect of HIO.  In 
our baseline regressions we use a predicted premium as our instrument.  The estimate for 
the non-offering firms is obtained by following Feldman et al. (1997) and Nichols et al. 
(2001) and using a five step process to estimate a firm’s probability of offering health 
insurance where steps 1-3 are essentially Heckman’s correction for selection bias.  
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Our models are run on data obtained from linking the LBD and the MEPS-IC.
The LBD is a longitudinal dataset providing us with business growth measures and 
survival while the MEPS-IC provides detailed information on insurance coverage, 
premium costs and workforce characteristics.  These linked data allow us to move beyond 
the limitations faced by others in studying the effect of offering health insurance on small 
businesses.
When we ran our models, we were surprised by the magnitude of the regression 
coefficients, particularly as they compared to plain OLS results.  They seemed to be far 
too large and were larger, not smaller, than the presumably biased OLS output.
With that important caveat, we note that the patterns in our results indicate that 
businesses offering health insurance, particularly small businesses, offer larger total 
compensation packages than do similar businesses that do not offer insurance coverage to 
their workers.  These businesses also grow faster and survive longer.  Again, the evidence 
was stronger for small firms.  
When we break the results out by age and size, young businesses (both large and 
small) that offer health insurance grow at not significantly different rates as those that do 
not, possibly due to selection effects.  However, older businesses (whether small or large) 
offering health insurance seem to have higher establishment employment and payroll 
growth.  Finally, survival was strongly, positively correlated with HIO for older 
establishments at both large and small firms (with the exception of young large firms).
These results suggest that young small businesses offering health insurance seem 
to be  more likely to survive, and once they have been in business for a while, offering 
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health insurance seems to increase their chances of success (as measured by employment 
and payroll growth).
We tested the robustness of these findings to a variety of instruments and found 
that the patterns hold across all our instrument sets.  When we tested the strength and 
endogeneity of our instruments (and the alternatives) the results were weak for large 
firms in particular.  However, we also note a number of concerns about the 
appropriateness of the methodology in our context.  Nonetheless, while our findings for 
large firms mirror those obtained for small firms, the results from the instrument tests, as 
well as the magnitudes of many of the coefficients themselves, indicate that caution 
should be exercised when interpreting our results.
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Table 2.1.  Percent of private-sector establishments and employees with health 
insurance offers by firm size: U.S., 2000-2005
All Less than 10-24 25-99 100-999 1000+
Year establishments 10 Employees Employees Employees Employees Employees
Percent of establishments that offer health insurance
2000 59.3 39.6 69.3 84.5 95 99.2
2001 58.3 38.6 67.4 83.2 95.4 99.4
2002 57.2 36.8 67.8 82.4 95.4 98.8
2003 56.2 35.6 66.2 81 93.5 98.6
2004 55.1 34.1 64 81.2 94.3 98.9
2005 56.3 35.7 64 82.6 94.2 98.9
Percent of employees in establishments that offer health insurance
2000 89.4 53.2 75.2 88.4 97.3 99.4
2001 88.8 48.1 72.5 87.5 96.7 99.8
2002 88.3 47.3 71.5 86.5 96.6 99.4
2003 86.8 45.8 70.6 84.1 95.8 98.7
2004 86.7 45.5 68.4 84.2 94.8 99.5
2005 86.9 43.7 68.2 85 93 99.4
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing 
Studies.  2000-2005 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component.  
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Table 2.2  Change in percent of private-sector establishments that offer health insurance by firm size and selected 
characteristics: 2000 to 2005 
Firm Size (number of employees)
<10 10-24 25-99 100-999 1000+
2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change
Industry Percents Percents Percents Percents Percents
Agriculture, 
fishing, forestry 24.6 19.6 -5 59.9 45.8 -14.1 77.7 86.4 8.7 87.7 58.4 -29.3 99.2 100 0.8
Mining & 
manufacturing 55 44.3 -10.7 83.5 77 -6.5 93.6 91.1 -2.5 99.1 99.2 0.1 99.9 100 0.1
Construction 35.9 34.1 -1.8 75.8 68 -7.8 86.4 84.6 -1.8 90.1 90.6 0.5 99.4 100 0.6
Utilities and 
transportation 39.6 29.9 -9.7 66.1 72.9 6.8 89.2 83 -6.2 99.7 90.6 -9.1 97.7 99.3 1.6
Wholesale trade 52.2 53 0.8 83.9 80.3 -3.6 95.4 93.9 -1.5 97.4 100 2.6 99.5 99.9 0.4
Financial 
services and real 
estate
42.3 38.9 -3.4 84.5 83.1 -1.4 95.9 93.7 -2.2 97.6 97 -0.6 99.9 98.3 -1.6
Retail trade 36.9 27.6 -9.3 72.3 59.5 -12.8 88.5 83 -5.5 95.4 93.9 -1.5 98.8 98.6 -0.2
Professional 
services 47.4 46.1 -1.3 78 76.7 -1.3 90.8 88.6 -2.2 97.2 95.7 -1.5 99.1 100 0.9
Other services 31.5 28.3 -3.2 48.9 46.4 -2.5 70.5 68.7 -1.8 90.5 89.2 -1.3 99 98.5 -0.5
Firm age
<5 years 31 23.9 -7.1 57 38.2 -18.8 63.3 52.1 -11.2 88.5 69.7 -18.8 95 74 -21
5-9 years 37.5 32 -5.5 61.6 53.5 -8.1 78 66.2 -11.8 94.1 81.4 -12.7 94.9 94 -0.9
10-19 years 41.6 36.8 -4.8 67.4 63.2 -4.2 84.4 79.6 -4.8 92.6 93.6 1 98.4 96.8 -1.6
20+ years 47.3 42.7 -4.6 78.9 73.7 -5.2 89.9 90.3 0.4 96.5 95.9 -0.6 98.8 99.8 1
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-
Insurance Component.  
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Table 2.3.  Factors related to decision to offer health insurance
Factors related to 
health insurance 
offers
Select studies and reports
Financial
Price sensitivity and
Premium variability
Gruber and Lettau, 2004
Hadley and Reschovsky, 2002
Feldman et al., 1997
Nichols et al., 1997
Cutler, 1994
Risk-related costs and
Participation rates
Gencarelli, 2005
Lee, 2002
General Accounting Office, 2001
Gruber, 2000
Cantor et al., 1995
Administrative costs
Abraham, et al. 2009
Pierron and Fronstin, 2008
Actuarial Research Corporation, 2003
Carpenter, 2003
Marquis and Long, 2001b 
Congressional Budget Office 2000
Wicks, Hall, and Meyer, 2000
General Accounting Office, 2000 and 2001
Nichols et al., 1997
Congressional Research Service, 1988
Tax advantages
Kauffman-RAND Institute for Entrepreneurship Public Policy, 2007
Fronstin et al., 2003
Labor market
Characteristics of 
employees 
and
Demand for own 
employer’s health 
insurance
Abraham et al., 2009
Econometrica, 2007
Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research Educational Trust, 2004
Fronstin et al., 2003
Glied et al., 2003
Holve et al., 2003
Lee 2002
Garrett et al., 2001
Headd, 2000
Monheit and Vistnes, 1999 and 1994
Nichols et al., 1997
Long and Marquis, 1993
Recruitment and 
retention
Marquis and Long, 2001a 
Nichols et al., 1997
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Table 2.3 continued.  Factors related to decision to offer health insurance
Factors related to 
health insurance 
offers
Select studies and reports
Insurance markets and products
Access
Neese, 2009
General Accounting Office, 2009
Carpenter, 2003
Insurance options with 
lower premium costs
Kauffman-RAND Institute for Entrepreneurship Public Policy, 2007
Gates et al., 2007
America’s Health Insurance Plans, 2006
Gencarelli, 2005
Health insurance regulatory environment
Legislation, offers, and 
business size
Kauffman-RAND Institute for Entrepreneurship Public Policy, 2007
Kapur et al., 2006
Kapur, 2004
State reform
Neese, 2009
Kauffman-RAND Institute for Entrepreneurship Public Policy, 2007
Matthews et al., 2006
Fronstin et al., 2003
Monheit and Schone 2003
Buchmueller and DiNardo 2002
Kaestner and Simon, 2002
General Accounting Office, 1995
Health insurance 
mandates
Pierron and Fronstin, 2008
Bunce and Wieske, 2005
Gencarelli, 2005
Jensen and Morrisey, 1999
Jensen and Gabel, 1992
Gabel and Jensen, 1989
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Table 2.4.  National totals for cost of hospitalization and physician service health 
plans offered by employers in the U.S. private sector 
2000 2005 Percent increase
from 2000 to 2005
(in millions of dollars)
Total costs 349,612 486,133 39.05%
Employer contribution
Single coverage
Family coverage
Total employer contribution
69,066
191,916
260,982
103,739
249,138
352,877
50.20%
29.82%
35.21%
Employee contribution
Single coverage
Family coverage
Total employee contribution
18,215
70,379
88,630
32,325
100,931
133,256
77.11%
29.82%
50.35%
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing 
Studies.  2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component.
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Table 2.5.  Change in percent of private-sector establishments that offer health insurance by firm size and selected workforce 
characteristics: 2000 to 2005 
Firm Size (number of employees)
<10 10-24 25-99 100-999 1000+
2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change
Percent full-
time employees
<25% 9.4 9.6 0.2 22.7 19.4 -3.3 52.8 54.7 1.9 81.3 73.9 -7.4 93.3 97.9 4.6
25-49% 36.3 28.8 -7.5 55.2 51.7 -3.5 73.5 74.8 1.3 95.7 89 -6.7 99.9 98.8 -1.1
50-74% 40.4 35.3 -5.1 64.6 57.3 -7.3 80.2 76.9 -3.3 95.9 94.6 -1.3 99.2 99.9 0.7
75% or more 47.4 43.1 -4.3 78.9 74.4 -4.5 91.3 88.3 -3 96.4 96.8 0.4 99.5 98.7 -0.8
Union 
presence
No union 
employees 39.9 36.2 -3.7 69.3 64 -5.3 84.9 82.7 -2.2 95.7 94.4 -1.3 99.1 98.7 -0.4
Has union 
employees 62.6 42.1 -20.5 81.7 85.9 4.2 92.5 91.8 -0.7 98.4 95.1 -3.3 99.8 99.9 0.1
Percent low-
wage 
employees
50+% low wage 25.4 18.8 -6.6 46.3 37.5 -8.8 73.5 63.3 -10.2 94.2 88 -6.2 96.4 98.3 1.9
<50% low 
wage
50.2 42.9 -7.3 83.4 76.5 -6.9 92.4 91.6 -0.8 96.9 97.3 0.4 99.4 99.1 -0.3
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey-Insurance Component.  
120
Table 2.6.  Annual percent change in national totals for cost of hospitalization and physician service health plans offered by 
employers in the U.S. private sector by industry category
Percent change
Industry 2000 to 2001 2001 to 2002 2002 to 2003 2003 to 2004 2004 to 2005
Agriculture, fishing, 
forestry 26.02 -0.29 -26.60 74.33 -26.02
Mining or 
manufacturing -4.00 5.05 2.04 0.79 7.83
Construction -4.98 1.87 16.97 11.87 12.93
Utilities or 
transportation 11.22 -0.29 3.44 23.91 2.07
Wholesale trade -5.16 8.24 8.27 5.05 15.91
Financial services 
or real estate 6.46 13.76 7.58 5.49 7.69
Retail trade -6.20 10.98 16.83 -1.7 10.14
Professional 
services 7.38 14.33 21.97 11.88 3.51
Other services 1.70 -1.74 5.53 5.17 11.20
Calculations based on data from Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 and 2005 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component.
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Table 2.7.  Characteristics of state small group health insurance markets 
State
Authorizes tax 
credits or 
deductions to small 
employers offering 
health insurance, 
2008a
Number of 
licensed 
carriers for 
small group 
health 
insurance 
market, 2008
b,130
Market share131
of largest carrier 
(percentage) in 
small group 
insurance 
market, 2008 b
Has COBRA132
expansions,
2009 a
Maximum
duration of 
continuation 
coverage 
(months), 
2009 a
Alabama No 7 96 No NA
Alaska No 11 77 No NA
Arizona Yes – credit 32 21 No NA
Arkansas No Not reported Not reported Yes 4
California No 28 37 Yes 36
Colorado No 21 23 Yes 18
Connecticut No 33 46 Yes 36
Delaware No 14 58 No NA
District of Columbia No 14 NA Yes 3
Florida No 27 30 Yes 29
Georgia Yes – credit 211 NA Yes 3
Hawaii No 7 NA Yes 3
130 GAO (2009) defines a carrier as an entity (either an insurer or managed health care plan) that bears the risk for and administers a range of health benefit
offerings.  33 of the 47 responding states defined small group as 2 to 50 employees, 12 states defined small as 1 to 50 employees, and the remaining states used 
other definitions.  
131 Market share is usually based on the number of covered lives (GAO 2009).
132 COBRA refers to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 that amended the federal law ERISA of 1974, which applied to firms with 20 
or more employees.  COBRA required temporary continuation of group health insurance to employees and their dependents when employment was terminated.  
As of 2009, 40 states subsequently established programs to extend COBRA coverage to firms with less than 20 workers.
122
Table 2.7 continued.  Characteristics of state small group health insurance markets
State
Authorizes tax 
credits or 
deductions to small 
employers offering 
health insurance, 
2008a
Number of 
licensed 
carriers for 
small group 
health 
insurance 
market, 2008 b
Market share of 
largest carrier 
(percentage) in 
small group 
insurance 
market, 2008 b
Has COBRA 
expansions, 
2009 a
Maximum 
duration of 
continuation 
coverage 
(months), 
2009 a
Idaho Yes – credit 18 49 No NA
Illinois No 53 51 Yes 24
Indiana No 328 NA No NA
Iowa No 28 60 Yes 9
Kansas Yes – credit 22 NA Yes 18
Kentucky Yes – credit 13 47 Yes 18
Louisiana No 403 53 Yes 12
Maine Yes - credit 8 56 Yes 12
Maryland Yes - credit 16 51 Yes 18
Massachusetts Yes - credit 28 44 Yes 36
Michigan No 49 47 No NA
Minnesota No 17 42 Yes 36
Mississippi No Not reported Not reported Yes 12
Missouri No 50 30 Yes 9
Montana Yes – credit 13 38 No NA
Nebraska No 58 NA Yes 12
Nevada No 28 NA Yes 36
New Hampshire No 10 50 Yes 36
New Jersey No 13 28 Yes 36
New Mexico No Not reported Not reported Yes 6
New York No 31 26 Yes 36
North Carolina No 27 65 Yes 18
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Table 2.7 continued.  Characteristics of state small group health insurance markets
State
Authorizes tax 
credits or 
deductions to small 
employers offering 
health insurance, 
2008a
Number of 
licensed 
carriers for 
small group 
health 
insurance 
market, 2008 b
Market share of 
largest carrier 
(percentage) in 
small group 
insurance 
market, 2008 b
Has COBRA 
expansions,
2009 a
Maximum 
duration of 
continuation 
coverage 
(months), 
2009 a
North Dakota No 10 91 Yes 36
Ohio Yes – deduction 180 35 Yes 6
Oklahoma Yes – credit 25 51 Yes 6
Oregon Yes – deduction 15 44 Yes 6
Pennsylvania No Not reported Not reported No NA
Rhode Island No 4 84 Yes 18
South Carolina No 27 47 Yes 6
South Dakota No 15 62 Yes 36
Tennessee No 33 68 Yes 15
Texas Yes - deduction 46 27 Yes 36
Utah No 31 39 Yes 6
Vermont No 5 45 Yes 12
Virginia No 36 NA No NA
Washington No 10 45 No NA
West Virginia No 27 52 Yes 18
Wisconsin No 41 32 Yes 18
Wyoming No 12 51 Yes 12
a Source: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts.  http://www.statehealthfacts.org
b Source: General Accounting Office, Private Health Insurance: 2008 Survey Results on Number and Market Share of Carriers in the 
Small Group Health Insurance Market, GAO-09-363R.  Washington, DC.  February 27, 2009.
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Table 5.1 LBD Data Illustration (mock data)
Year Firm ID Establishment ID Employment Multi/Single  Unit Firm? Zip Code
2000 10001 0001 15 MU 11758
2000 10001 0002 322 MU 11758
2000 10001 0003 183 MU 01984
2000 10002 0001 10 SU 20024
2000 10003 0001 53 SU 23336
2001 10001 0001 17 MU 11758
2001 10001 0002 352 MU 11758
2001 10001 0003 201 MU 01984
2001 10001 0004 14 MU 20688
2001 10003 0001 51 SU 23336
2001 10004 0001 3 SU 33324
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Table 5.2 Sample LBD Statistics
Firm Size Employment
Share 2005
Net Employment
Growth 2000-2005
Number of
Firms Share 2005
Net Growth in
# of Firms 2000-2005
1 to 9 12% 6% 82% 4%
10 to 24 9% 1% 11% 3%
25 to 99 14% 1% 5% 6%
100 to 999 21% 4% 2% 17%
1000 plus 44% -2% 0% 14%
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Table 5.3 Average Total Single Premium per Enrolled Employee at Private-sector Establishments that Offer Health 
Insurance by Firm Size
Year
Less than 10 
employees
10-24 employees 25-99 employees
100-999
employees
1000 or more 
employees
1996 $2,229 $2,016 $1,923 $1,901 $2,015
2004 $3,998 $3,659 $3,650 $3,684 $3,684
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Financing, Access and Cost Trends. 1996 and 2004 Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component.
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Table 6.1: Means of Dependent Variable and Establishment Characteristics by Size
Variable 
Continuer 
Establishments 
in Small Firms 
Continuer 
Establishments 
in Large Firms 
Health Insurance Offering 56.8% 97.0%
# Employees (2001) 10.4 285.9
Payroll (2001) $1000 1.7 64.2
Average wage (2001) 16.1 19.3
Firm age 12.2 18.1
Multi-establishment firm 6.0% 76.8%
Percent women 45.7% 36.4%
Percent over 50 22.4% 13.5%
Percent unionized 1.5% 7.2%
Non-profit 13.1% 16.2%
For-profit 64.8% 72.9%
Percent low-wage employees 25.6% 20.2%
Manufacturing 6.5% 15.9%
Utilities/Transportation 2.5% 4.5%
Construction 11.9% 3.9%
Wholesale 5.7% 5.7%
Retail 13.4% 14.3%
Professional services 24.0% 23.4%
Finance/Real Estate 7.0% 11.6%
Other 26.2% 19.9%
N 11509 8186
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Table 7.1 IV & OLS Results on the Effect of Health Insurance Offering on Employment, Payroll and Average Wage Levels 
by Firm Size 
IV OLS
Employmenta Payroll
Average 
Wage Employmenta Payroll
Average 
Wage
Small Firms
(N= 11,509) 2.9894*** 3.7382*** 0.7488*** 0.4564*** 0.7964*** 0.3401***
(0.1060) (0.1251) (0.0491) (0.0190) (0.0242) (0.0157)
Large Firms
(N= 8,186) 0.8079* 1.5778*** 0.7699*** 0.2655*** 0.4873*** 0.2218***
(0.4313) (0.5634) (0.2629) (0.1023) (0.0974) (0.0727)
a
Employment, Payroll and Average Wage are in logs form.
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* (**) (***) Significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level.
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Table 7.2: IV & OLS Results on the Effect of Health Insurance Offering on Employment, Payroll & Average Wage Growth
and Establishment Survival by Firm Size 
IV OLS
% Change
Employmenta
% Change
Payroll
% Change
Average 
Wage Survival
% Change
Employmenta
% Change
Payroll
% Change
Average 
Wage Survival
Small Firms
Ngrowth= 11,509
0.1249*** 0.0809* -0.0424 0.0956*** 0.0445*** 0.0105 -0.0367*** 0.0347***
(0.0410) (0.0454) (0.0393) (0.0183) (0.0139) (0.0150) (0.0132) (0.0071)
Large Firms
Ngrowth =8,186
0.4677* 0.3884 -0.2206 0.5832*** 0.1048** 0.0858* -0.0303 0.0602***
(0.2543) (0.2334) (0.2053) (0.0711) (0.0468) (0.0438) (0.0381) (0.0250)
* (**) (***) Significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level.
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 7.3 IV Results on the Effect of Health Insurance Offering on Employment, Payroll and Average Wage Levels by Firm 
Size & Age
Employmenta Payroll Average Wage
Small Firms Young 2.8694*** 3.6244*** 0.7550***
(0.2024) (0.2395) (0.1000)
Old 3.0831*** 3.8515*** 0.7684***
(0.1213) (0.1461) (0.0559)
Large Firms Young 1.5781 2.1806* 0.6025
(1.1018) (1.2469) (0.4020)
Old 0.6649 1.4559*** 0.7909***
(0.4896) (0.6640) (0.3393)
a
Employment, Payroll and Average Wage are in logs form.
* (**) (***) Significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level.
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 7.4 IV Results on the Effect of Health Insurance Offering on Employment, Payroll & Average Wage Growth and 
Establishment Survival by Firm Size and Age 
% Change 
Employment % Change Payroll
% Change Average 
Wage Survival
Small Firms Young -0.021 -0.1278 -0.1349 0.1438***
(0.0931) (0.1058) (0.0874) (0.0365)
Old 0.1636*** 0.1373*** -0.0118 0.1162***
(0.0422) (0.0442) (0.0405) (0.0205)
Large Firms Young -0.4683 -0.0895 0.3993 0.1166
(0.5034) (0.4086) (0.4737) (0.1749)
Old 0.7089*** 0.5353* -0.386 0.3895***
(0.2996) (0.2854) (0.2296) (0.0798)
* (**) (***) Significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level.
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 7.5: Alternative IV Specifications
Small Firms Large Firms
Employment Baseline Model 2.9687*** 0.5836
(0.1066) (0.4134)
Medicare & State 3.4345*** 1.1336**
(0.1302) (0.5035)
Medicare & County-level Variables 4.1787*** 1.1745**
(0.1711) (0.5122)
County-Level Controls & State 3.3654*** 1.1279**
(0.1262) (0.5035)
County-Level Controls 4.2083*** 1.1923**
(0.1730) (0.5205)
Payroll Baseline Model 3.7064*** 1.2239**
(0.1259) (0.5295)
Med Medicare & State 3.9666*** 1.4249***
(0.1434) (0.5418)
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 4.8296*** 1.6064***
(0.1875) (0.5644)
County-Level Controls & State 3.9159*** 1.4546***
(0.1395) (0.5436)
County-Level Controls 4.8837*** 1.6413***
(0.1901) (0.5768)
Average Wage Baseline Model 0.7377*** 0.6403**
(0.0492) (0.2508)
Med Medicare & State 0.5321*** 0.2913
(0.0512) (0.2403)
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 0.6509*** 0.4320
(0.0577) (0.2631)
County-Level Controls & State 0.5504*** 0.3267
(0.0505) (0.2385)
County-Level Controls 0.6754*** 0.4491*
(0.0579) (0.2580)
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Table 7.5 Cont.: Alternative IV Specifications
Small Firms Large Firms
% Change Employment Baseline Model 0.1407*** 0.4841*
(0.0415) (0.2546)
Med Medicare & State 0.1669*** 0.5338**
(0.0450) (0.2415)
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 0.1925*** 0.5495**
(0.0496) (0.2468)
County-Level Controls & State 0.1546*** 0.5327**
(0.0442) (0.2414)
County-Level Controls 0.1813*** 0.5478**
(0.0496) (0.2469)
% Change Payroll Baseline Model 0.1116** 0.4267*
(0.0458) (0.2320)
Med Medicare & State 0.1440*** 0.5833***
(0.0494) (0.2256)
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 0.1403*** 0.6539***
(0.0531) (0.2368)
County-Level Controls & State 0.1301*** 0.6053**
(0.0486) (0.2243)
County-Level Controls 0.1288** 0.6513***
(0.0531) (0.2356)
% Change Average Wage Baseline Model -0.0261 -0.1937
(0.0394) (0.2063)
Med Medicare & State -0.0191 -0.0672
(0.0417) (0.2223)
Med Medicare & County-level Vars -0.05 -0.013
(0.0448) (0.2301)
County-Level Controls & State -0.0206 -0.0399
(0.0411) (0.2244)
County-Level Controls -0.0492 -0.0128
(0.0449) (0.2297)
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Table 7.6 IV F-Tests
Model Tested Small Firms Large Firms
F-Stat Overid p-Value F-Stat
Overid
p-Value
Employment Baseline Model 9.21 0.00 1.83 0.00
Med Medicare & State 9.09 0.12 1.82 0.00
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 2.98 0.00 1.24 0.00
County-Level Controls & State 9.46 0.00 2.00 0.00
County-Level Controls 0.14 0.53 1.07 0.46
Payroll Baseline Model 9.21 0.00 1.83 0.00
Med Medicare & State 9.09 0.00 1.82 0.00
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 2.98 0.00 1.24 0.00
County-Level Controls & State 9.46 0.00 2.00 0.00
County-Level Controls 0.14 0.04 1.07 0.00
Average Wage Baseline Model 9.21 0.00 1.83 0.00
Med Medicare & State 9.09 0.00 1.82 0.00
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 2.98 0.00 1.24 0.00
County-Level Controls & State 9.46 0.00 2.00 0.00
County-Level Controls 0.14 0.00 1.07 0.00
% Change Employment Baseline Model 9.21 0.22 1.83 0.00
Med Medicare & State 9.09 0.14 1.82 0.00
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 2.98 0.18 1.24 0.01
County-Level Controls & State 9.46 0.26 2.00 0.00
County-Level Controls 0.14 0.29 1.07 0.00
% Change Payroll Baseline Model 9.21 0.08 1.83 0.00
Med Medicare & State 9.09 0.05 1.82 0.00
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 2.98 0.00 1.24 0.02
County-Level Controls & State 9.46 0.02 2.00 0.00
County-Level Controls 0.14 0.10 1.07 0.01
% Change Average 
Wage Baseline Model 9.21 0.01 1.83 0.00
Med Medicare & State 9.09 0.01 1.82 0.00
Med Medicare & County-level Vars 2.98 0.24 1.24 0.17
County-Level Controls & State 9.46 0.02 2.00 0.00
County-Level Controls 0.14 0.19 1.07 0.08
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Figure 2.1.  Difference in percent of establishments from firms with less than 10 employees and 1000 or more employees 
offering health insurance: 2000
Percentage point difference
64.9 - 77.1
60.5 - 64.9
54.8 - 60.5
52 - 54.8
40.5 - 52
No data
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey-Insurance Component.  
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Figure 2.2.  Difference in percent of establishments from firms with less than 10 employees and 1000 or more employees 
offering health insurance: 2005
Percentage point difference
68.7 - 79.3
63.8 - 68.7
61.3 - 63.8
57.8 - 61.3
38.8 - 57.8
No data
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2005 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey-Insurance Component. 
138
Figure 2.3.  Change in average total single premium (in dollars) per enrolled employee at private-sector establishments that 
offer health insurance by firm size: U.S., 2000 and 2005 
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Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies. 2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey-Insurance Component.
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Figure 2.4.  Percent increase in Premiums for Single Coverage from 2000 to 2005: 
Private Sector Establishments Belonging to Firms with Less Than 10 Employees
Percent change in average total single premium per enrolled employee 2000 to 2005
67.8 - 96.2
55.4 - 67.8
42.7 - 55.4
35.2 - 42.7
11.2 - 35.2
No data
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey-Insurance Component.  
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Figure 2.5.  Percent increase in Premiums for Family Coverage from 2000 to 2005: 
Private Sector Establishments Belonging to Firms with less than 10 Employees
Percent increase in average total family premium per enrolled employee
60.5 - 86.2
58.7 - 60.5
56.8 - 58.7
49.6 - 56.8
31.8 - 49.6
No data
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey-Insurance Component.  
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Figure 2.6.  State Health Insurance Index from Council for Affordable Health Insurance
Index total
60 - 95
50 - 60
40 - 50
15 - 40
5 - 15
No data
Note: Index for Alaska and Hawaii is 55 and 40, respectively.
Source: Matthews, Merrill, J.P. Wieske, and Victoria Craig Bunce.  2006.  “State Health Insurance Index 2006: A 50-State 
Comparison of the Nation’s Health Insurance Market.  Report from the Council for Affordable Health Insurance.  Alexandria, VA.
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Figure 2.7.  Mandated benefits by state and contribution towards premium costs: 2005
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3 percent by a weight of 2, and those contributing less than 1 percent by a weight of 1.  The cost-range estimates are calculated as if 
the mandate were added to a comprehensive family policy that did not include the coverage (Bunce and Wieske, 2005).   
Source: Victoria Craig Bunce and J.P. Wieske.  2005.  “Health Insurance Mandates in the States: 2005.”  Report prepared for the 
Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Alexandria, VA.
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Figure 3.1.  Average total employee contribution (in dollars) per enrolled employee at private-sector establishments that offer 
health insurance by firm size: U.S.
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Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey-Insurance Component.  
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Figure 3.2.  Percent of total premiums contributed by enrolled employees at private-sector establishments that offer health 
insurance by firm size: U.S.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Total <10 10-24 25-99 100-999 1000+
Firm size
%
 o
f p
re
m
iu
m
 c
on
tri
bu
te
d 
by
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
Single: 2000
Single: 2005
Family: 2000
Family: 2005
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey-Insurance Component.
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Figure 3.3.  Percent of total premiums contributed for single coverage by employees enrolled at private-sector establishments 
that offer health insurance by firm size and percent low-wage employees*: U.S.
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* Low wage: 50 percent or more of the establishment’s workers earn low wages
High wage: less than 50 percent of the establishment’s workers earn low wages
Note: In 2000, the MEPS-IC defined low wage as less than $9.50 per hour and in 2005 defined low wage as less than $10 per hour.
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey-Insurance Component.
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Figure 3.4.  Percent of private-sector establishments that offer health insurance that offer at least one health insurance plan 
that required no employee contribution by firm size: U.S.
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Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies.  2000 and 2005 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey-Insurance Component.
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Figure 4.1  Unemployment Rate Comparison: Detroit MI vs. Bethesda-Rockville MD
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program.
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